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Foreword
The role played by shadow economy in monetary and fiscal policy transmissions have received
considerable attention from researchers and policy-makers because they shed more light on the
transmission processes. Many theoretical literatures have suggested that shadow economy or the
informal sector is a powerful buffer which absorbs large proportions of the transmission channels
of macroeconomic policies. Recent development in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models have gained momentum due to its ability to evaluate alternative macroeconomic
policy measures. However, such developments were tailored towards the advanced economies
and therefore lacked the prerequisite ingredients to be used for modelling developing and
emerging economies where certain features of the advanced countries are lacking. Empirical
literature on developing countries suggest that most of these economies are characterised by
weak financial sector, large proportions of liquidity constrained individuals, existence of large
informal sector, external shock vulnerabilities and weak economic and political institutions.
Given this background, our main aim is to develop a theoretical DSGE model with shadow
economy and investigate their impact on the transmissions of monetary and fiscal policies in
developing and emerging countries. Our baseline model follows Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007), and we include the necessary altercations to suits our research interest. The dissertation
is organised in three chapters as follows.
Chapter one seeks to examine the transmission effects and efficacy of monetary policy and other
structural shocks in a standard new Keynesian DSGE model with the interaction of shadow
economy. Our model determines whether the presence of shadow economy affects the responses
of the official economy and also clarifies the changes in the transmission mechanism within
both sectors. The chapter contained five exogenous processes in the official sector namely the
risk premium shock, investment specific shock, total factor productivity, price mark-up shock
and the conventional monetary policy shock. In effects, our model showed that the presence of
shadow economy induces factor flows across sectors and crowding-out of formal sector’s activities
into the shadow sector when there are negative transmissions of the shock in the formal sector.
This strengthens the existing notion that shadow sector serves as a cyclical buffer in a two-sector
model.
The second chapter describes a new Keynesian DSGE model with shadow economy and
investigate the role of fiscal policies over the aggregate business cycle. In this chapter, we
sought to elucidate whether the presence of shadow economy dampens or amplifies the effect of
fiscal policy transmissions. We further tried to understand whether fiscal policies can be used
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to stabilise the economy in response to shocks. We concluded that, tax hikes in an economy
with relatively large informal sector lead to a sizeable tax evasion and a boost in the shadow
economy making standard aggregate estimates of fiscal policies ineffective while government
spending shock slows down the activities in the shadow sector. We also found that the presence
of shadow sector lead to factor inputs reallocation across sectors during fiscal policy shocks.
It also turns out that the incorporation of shadow sector significantly reduces the government
spending multipliers whereas the labour income tax multipliers are increased. Our results from
the fiscal feedbacks on government spending (income taxes) stabilized the economy by reducing
(raising) output levels and these results even become stronger with the presence of shadow
economy.
In chapter three, we study the interplay of rule-of-thumb consumers and the presence of shadow
economy focusing on fiscal policy disturbances. Our basic motivation is to know whether the
incorporation of shadow economy weakens the amplifying effect of rule-of-thumb consumers on
fiscal multipliers. Our results indicated that the amplifying mechanism caused by rule-of-thumb
consumers becomes irrelevant given that the disposable income of the rule-of-thumb households
as a weighted average of labour incomes earned from the two sectors is virtually unaffected by
the fiscal shocks.
In a nut shell, our model contributes to provide a theoretical background to policy-oriented
literature that sees consumer and sectoral heterogeneity as an important component of future
macroeconomic policy framework. Our results have shown that shadow economies play a
significant role in both monetary and fiscal policy analysis and it therefore become paramount
to incorporate them in DSGE models especially in economies with relatively larger share of
shadow activities. This would help policy makers to understand the underlying transmission
processes to make informed decisions.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
Monetary Policy Transmissions in Developing Countries: A
DSGE Model with Shadow Economy.
1.1 Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (henceforth DSGE) models are basically the extension
of the Real Business Cycle (henceforth RBC) models with the introduction of price and wage
rigidities. The most important recent contributions in terms of specification and standardization
of modelling procedures involved in DSGE modelling are due to Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007) and Christiano et al. (2005). As a result of this significant improvement in DSGE
modelling literature, many central banks of advanced countries have already developed DSGE
models for policy analysis and forecasting. These models have succeeded in replicating business
cycles features of developed economies and with considerable importance for policy analysis and
forecasting at central banks. However, for developing and low-income countries, the adoption
of such models require a significant amount of altercations to be coherent with relevant micro
evidence. Most developing countries are characterised by weak financial sector, existence of
large informal sector, external shock vulnerability, and weak economic and political institutions.
The challenge of data inconsistency and unavailability in most developing and low-income
countries also become a problem. For most of the existing literature on DSGE models for
emerging economies, key parameters are borrowed from the advanced economy literature and
data transformation remains inadequate. It therefore becomes erroneous to implement the same
DSGE models built for developed economies in the developing countries without the necessary
considerations of developing countries microeconomic features. The role played by informal
sector on monetary policy transmission and economic activities have received considerable
attention in recent times among academic researchers and policy makers. In spite of this,
relatively little has been written on the conduct of monetary policy transmissions on economies
with large informal sectors.1 The study of informal sectors in the economy have become
paramount because they shed more light on the transmission processes of monetary policy
in both developed and developing countries. It must also be emphasized that informal sectors
1Informality is described here as the unregistered, hidden, shadow or unofficial economic activities which are
not under the purview of policy makers. The terms are used interchangeably with informal sector or shadow
economy in this literature.
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are mostly observed in developing and low-income countries especially in Sub-Sahara Africa,
the Caribbean, the Asia and slightly observed in some advanced countries like the eastern
European countries. Given this background, the study seeks to examine the transmission
effects and efficacy of macroeconomic policies with informal sectors and further introduces
other structural shocks to capture certain economic features of a standard DSGE model. Our
model would determine whether the presence of shadow economy affects the responses of the
official economy and also to clarify the changes in the transmission mechanism from the official
to shadow sector.
DSGE literature is scant on developing countries and over the years efforts are been made by
policy makers to capture the salient features of developing countries. Batini et al. (2011) has
recently developed a DSGE model for Indian economy with informality in goods market in
the presence of credit constraints. They also introduced labour market frictions in the formal
sector using Zenou (2008). With the use of Bayesian technique for estimating parameters, they
showed that the inclusion of informal sector and financial frictions improved their model fitness.
Peiris and Saxegaard (2007) introduced credit frictions in the presence of informality with an
assumption that part of the inputs used in the production are financed through borrowing at a
premium over deposits from the informal sector. The study was aimed at evaluating monetary
policy trade-offs in low-income countries with informal lending sources. Conesa et al. (2002)
incorporated informal goods producing sector with differentiated technology in a simple real
business cycle model. In this model, sectoral trade-off is allowed in the presence of a wage
premium in the formal sector. Furthermore, labour is assumed to be indivisible in the formal
sector and households can choose working between the two sectors with a given probability.
Aruoba (2010), and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) also introduced cash-in-advance constraint
to differentiate informal sector from the formal sector by assuming that money is the only
medium of exchange used in the informal sector. They found that large informal sector gets
smaller in size and overall tax collection becomes higher under rising inflation. Mattesini and
Rossi (2009) analysed the monetary policy in a dual economy in the new Keynesian framework
with one competitive (informal) and one unionized (formal) sector. They concluded that, the
level of output is associated with the relative size of the two sectors. Castillo and Montoro (2008)
modelled their economy with frictions in the labour market by introducing formal and informal
labour contracts and analysed the interaction between the two sectors and monetary policy.
They introduced informality through hiring costs owing to labour market. In their model, firms
in the wholesale sector are assumed to balance the high productivity in formal sector with the
lower hiring costs faced by the informal sector. The main finding of this theoretical framework
is the cyclical behaviour of informal sector. Through this channel a link between informality,
2
the inflation dynamics and monetary policy is established and the study supports the idea of
informal labour market being a buffer for an economy. Colombo et al. (2016) investigates
the response of the shadow economy to banking crises. Their empirical analysis based on a
large sample of countries suggests that the informal sector is a powerful buffer, which expands
during banking crises and absorbs a large proportion of the fall in the official output. They
assumed limited access to external finance and production technology to be relatively more
labour intensive in the informal sector. Following a banking shock in the official sector, the
model predicted a large negative transmission to the unofficial economy.
In view of this, we build a qualitative DSGE model with formal and informal sector in the
goods market based on Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). Smets and Wouters model built on
Christiano et al. (2005), but features a number of frictions that appear to be necessary to
capture the empirical persistence in the main Euro area macroeconomic data. Many of these
frictions have become quite standard in the DSGE literature. Smets and Wouters (2007) model
exhibits both sticky nominal prices and wages that adjust following a Calvo mechanism but we
deviate from that and model goods producer’s prices using Rotemberg (1982) framework with
full indexation of prices.2 Our model also incorporates a variable capital utilisation rate which
tends to smooth the adjustment of the rental rate of capital in response to changes in output.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the cost of adjusting the utilisation rate is expressed in terms
of consumption goods. The cost of adjusting the capital stock is modelled as a function of the
changes in investment, rather than the level of investments. An important feature of our model
is a competitive labour market where firms in the two sectors pay the same consumption real
wage. This assumption is motivated by the theoretical contributions from Amaral and Quintin
(2006); Pratap and Quintin (2006) and supported by Maloney (1999, 2004). The contributions
by Pratap and Quintin (2006) on developing countries provided evidence against labour market
segmentation and suggested that labour market arguments are not necessary to account for the
silent features of labour market in developing countries. Another deviation from Smets and
Wouters model is the calibration of technologies and price mark-ups parameters in each sector.
The model introduces several structural shocks asymmetrically in the formal sector that include
risk premium, investment, technological, price mark-up and the conventional monetary policy
shock.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; in the next section (section two) we present
and extensively discuss the features of the theoretical DSGE model, section three involves
the description of parameters used for calibrating the model to fit developing and low-income
countries and analyse the results of the model and the last section (section four) concludes the
2In fact, Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) follows a partial indexation of prices.
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research.
1.2 The Model
In this section we introduce and discusses the qualitative DSGE model based on Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) with two-sectors, official sector and the shadow sector. The model
features the following types of agents: households, intermediate goods producers and final
goods producers operating in each sector of the economy. We then introduce the standard
monetary policy rule set by the Central Bank to complete the model. Households are standard
and maximises a utility function over a time horizon, supply the same level of labour services to
goods producers in each sector. In fact, we do not explicitly model the financial sector, however,
as argued in Justiniano et al. (2011), investment specific shocks may be interpreted as a proxy
for more fundamental disturbances to the functioning of the financial sector. Households wealth
is accumulated by purchasing government bonds and investment in production. Households also
decide on how much capital to accumulate based on the capital adjustment cost and capital
utilisation. The intermediate goods producers supply their intermediate goods to final goods
producers who differentiate and repackage them into final goods for households’ consumption.
Final goods producers in both sectors are able to reset their prices ala Rotemberg model. And
finally, we model the central bank to follow strictly inflation targeting policy, this enable us to
follow carefully the monetary transmission mechanisms in the economy.
1.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure unity who supply labour services to firms in both
sectors of the economy. Each household is composed by individuals who work in the official
and unofficial sectors. Each household member consumes, work and return the wages they
earn to the household. Households hold their financial wealth in the form of government bond
and also by supplying capital to goods producers in both sectors. The remaining part of their
income is spent on consumption goods obtained from final goods producers and investment in
physical capital. Households total income therefore consist of labour income, plus cash flow
from participating in state-contingent securities offered by the government or the central bank,
the returns on physical capital stock and profit derived from investing in goods producers.
Within each household, there is a mutual consumption risk sharing so individual consumption
decisions are the same and independent from their working conditions. The representative
4
agent’s lifetime utility is characterize by:
U it = Et
∞∑
n=0
βn
{
ln(cit+n)− χ
l
i(1+φ)
t
1 + φ
}
(1.1)
where χ is a parameter that regulates the disutility of work and φ defines the Frisch elasticity
of substitution for labour. Household members, for each sector, own the goods producers, hold
physical capital and choose their investment to both sectors of the economy. As a result of
consumption risk sharing of sectoral employments, consumption and investment decisions are
identical across individuals. Households can increase the supply of rental services from capital
by investing in additional capital and also through their capital utilisation.
Households consumption basket ct is described as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregate over the two-sector’s consumption bundle:
ct =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cut )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (1.2)
Furthermore, each ct is also defined as:
ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
i
(
i−1
i
)
t dz
i
) i
i−1
where ϕc indicates official sector consumption goods bias and c > 1 is the measure of elasticity
of substitution between official and unofficial consumption bundles (cot ) and (cut ) whereas i > 1
measures the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods that form ct. Minimizing
total consumption expenditure subject to the consumption bundle given above yields the
following demand function for each good:
cot = ϕc
(
P ot
Pt
)−c
ct (1.3)
cut = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
ct (1.4)
The consumption price index is given as:
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (1.5)
In a symmetric way, households provide labour services to both sectors of the economy and we
assume nominal wages to be flexible in both sectors, thus labour market equilibrium requires
that the marginal rate of substitution between total labour supplied to both sectors equals the
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real consumption wage in the economy.3
Their intertemporal budget constraint is:4
ct +
P ot
Pt
iot +
Put
Pt
iut +
Bt
PtRtεRISKt
=
P ot
Pt
wot l
o
t +
Put
Pt
wut l
u
t +
P ot
Pt
rk,ot u
o
t k¯
o
t+
+
Put
Pt
rk,ut u
u
t k¯
u
t +
Bt−1
Pt
− P
o
t
Pt
a(uot )k¯
o
t −
Put
Pt
a(uut )k¯
u
t +
P ot
Pt
Πot +
Put
Pt
Πut (1.6)
where Bt is government bond that pays one unit of currency in period t− 1 and Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate. We define a number of sectoral variables: the relative goods prices P it ,
the capital kit, labour lit, the returns on capital r
k,i
t , the utilisation rate of capital a(uit) and Πit
being the profit received from investment in goods production. εRISKt is the risk premium in
the returns to bonds, which might reflect a premium that households require to hold on one
period bond and it follows an AR(1) stochastic process with an i.i.d error term given as:
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (1.7)
Households sectoral capital accumulation is driven by the standard dynamic equation for capital
given respectively as:
k¯ot+1 = (1− δ)k¯ot + εINVt
[
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)]
iot (1.8)
k¯ut+1 = (1− δ)k¯ut +
[
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)]
iut (1.9)
where S(.) is the capital adjustment cost function and δ is the depreciation rate.5 εINVt is the
stochastic shock to the price of investment relative to consumption goods and it also follows an
exogenous process with an i.i.d. error term given as:
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (1.10)
Here we note that, exogenous investment shock affects only investment in the official sector and
not the shadow sector investment. Households in addition choose the utilisation rate of capital
with the amount of effective capital given as:6
kit = u
i
tk¯
i
t−1 (1.11)
3The labour market equilibrium requires that wt = mrst, where mrst = −Ul,t/Uc,t is the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labour supplied in period t+ n for the households. This means that the
official and shadow sector would pay the same consumption wage to workers (Gali, 2008).
4Here we ignore superscript i.
5In the steady state, S(1) = S′(1) = 0, S′′(1) > 0 ≡ $ with $ being the adjustment cost parameter.
6In the steady state, utilisation cost function implies that: uis = 1 and a(1) = 0.
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Households face the usual maximization problem of maximizing their expected discounted sum
of instantaneous utility (1.1) subject to equations (1.6), (1.8), (1.9) and (1.11). Letting λt
denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the household’s budget constraint and λtQit the Lagrange
multiplier for the capital accumulation equations whereby Qit is the Tobin’s q which is equal to
one, when there are no capital adjustment costs. It can be interpreted as the shadow relative
price of one unit of capital with respect to one unit of consumption. The first order conditions
with respect to consumption (ct), government bond (Bt), sectoral labour (lit), sectoral capital
(k¯it+1), sectoral investment (iit) and capital utilisation (uit) are respectively given below.7 The
intertemporal marginal utility of consumption is:
Uc,t = λt =
1
ct
(1.12)
The consumption Euler equation from government bond is:
λt = ε
RISK
t RtβEt
λt+1
pit+1
(1.13)
In competitive labour market, the standard labour supply conditions hold as:
Uol,t =
P ot
Pt
wot =
χloφt
λt
(1.14)
Uul,t =
Put
Pt
wut =
χluφt
λt
(1.15)
The arbitrage condition in the labour market ensures that both sectors pay the same level of
real wage as:
P ot
Pt
wot =
Put
Pt
wut (1.16)
The competitive capital supplied to each sector is accordingly given as:
Qot = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
P ot+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ot+1u
o
t+1 − a(uot+1)
]
+Qot+1(1− δ)
]
(1.17)
Qut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
Put+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ut+1u
u
t+1 − a(uut+1)
]
+Qut+1(1− δ)
]
(1.18)
The first order conditions for investments supplied to each sector is given as:
P ot
Pt
= Qot ε
INV
t
(
1−S
(
iot
iot−1
)
−S′
(
iot
iot−1
)
iot
iot−1
)
+βEt
λt+1
λt
Qot+1ε
INV
t+1 S
′
(
iot+1
iot
)(
iot+1
iot
)2
(1.19)
7A detailed derivations of all the first order conditions are in the appendix.
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Put
Pt
= Qut
(
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)
− S′
(
iut
iut−1
)
iut
iut−1
)
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
Qut+1S
′
(
iut+1
iut
)(
iut+1
iut
)2
(1.20)
And finally, the following equations also gives the first order conditions for effective capital
utilised:
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (1.21)
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (1.22)
solving equations (1.12) and (1.13) for ct we obtain the consumption Euler equation.
1.2.2 Official Sector Goods Producers
The official sector firms produce intermediate goods and sell them at the competitive
intermediate goods price P I,ot to final goods producers. The production function for a
representative firm is given as:
yot = A
o
tk
o(αo)
t l
o(1−αo)
t (1.23)
where yot , kot and lot respectively denote sectoral output, capital and labour inputs. Aot is the
official sector productivity shock which is defined as an AR(1) process with i.i.d error term.
Official sector firms maximize their market value by choosing labour (lot ) and capital (kot ) taking
into account their production output level. Firms market value (Πot ) is expressed as:
Πot =
P I,ot
Pt
[
yot − wot lot − rk,ot kot
]
(1.24)
where wot and r
k,o
t are respectively sectoral real wage rate and real returns from capital.
P I,ot
Pt
yot
represent the firm’s revenue from selling output, and P
I,o
t
Pt
(wot l
o
t + r
k,o
t k
o
t ) are the repayments
made by firms to households which consist of the wage bill and cost of physical capital. The
following equations respectively represent the first order conditions for official sector labour and
capital:
wot = (1− αo)Aot
(
kot
lot
)αo
(1.25)
rk,ot = α
oAot
(
kot
lot
)−(1−αo)
(1.26)
This implies an official sector capital-labour ratio given as:
rk,ot
wot
=
αo
1− αo
lot
kot
(1.27)
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Solving equations (1.25) and (1.26) yield official sector’s real marginal cost as:
mcI,ot =
(
rk,ot
αo
)αo(
wot
1− αo
)1−αo
(1.28)
1.2.3 Shadow Sector Goods Producers
Informal sector goods producers obtain working capital from households each period in order
to start production of shadow goods. The production function of the representative goods
producer in the shadow sector is given as:
yut = k
u(αu)
t l
u(1−αu)
t (1.29)
where yut , kut and lut respectively define sectoral output, capital and labour. αu is the usual
capital share used in production activities. They choose capital obtained from households and
labour optimally in each period to maximize their market value (Πut ) given as:
Πut =
P I,ut
Pt
yut −
P I,ut
Pt
wut l
u
t −
P I,ut
Pt
rk,ut k
u
t
where the first term on the r.h.s of the equation above represents the revenue obtained from
selling shadow intermediate goods to final goods producers and the remaining part represent
the periodic repayments to households. The first order conditions for labour and capital are
given respectively as:
wut = (1− αu)
(
kut
lut
)αu
(1.30)
rk,ut = α
u
(
kut
lut
)−(1−αu)
(1.31)
This in turn yield the shadow sector capital-labour input as:
rk,ut
wut
=
αu
1− αu
lut
kut
(1.32)
Solving equations (1.30) and (1.31) yield unofficial sector’s real marginal cost as:
mcI,ut =
(
rk,ut
αu
)αu(
wut
1− αu
)1−αu
(1.33)
1.2.4 Final Goods Producers
We assume a sticky price specification based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment cost in
both sectors of the economy. We index their prices to a combination of both current and past
9
inflation with a weight equal to θpi. The final goods producers maximize their profit function
by choosing their final goods prices taking into account the quadratic adjustment cost given as:
κp
2
(
P it /P
i
t−1
(piit−1)
θpi
− 1
)2
yit
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost in adjusting its
nominal prices that can be measured in terms of the final goods with κp being the price stickiness
parameter which accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer-firm relation
and θpi representing the price indexation parameter.
The official sector final goods producers are subject to price mark-up shocks, hence in a
symmetric equilibrium, the Rotemberg version of non-linear New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) is derived as:
(1−mcot )ot = 1− κp
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)
piot
piot−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piot+1
piot
θpi
− 1
)
piot+1
piot
θpi
yot+1
yot
]
(1.34)
where ot is now a stochastic parameter which determines the time-varying mark-up in the
official goods markets. In light of this, following Smets and Wouters (2003), the official sector
final goods producers’ actual mark-up hovers around its desired level over time. This desired
level comprises of an endogenous and exogenous components which is assumed to follow an
AR(1) process given as:
lnot = ln
o + lnεpt
lnεpt = lnε
p
t−1 + ξ
p
t (1.35)
with ξpt being an i.i.d. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price adjustment rule satisfies the
following first order condition for the shadow goods producers given as:
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)
piut
piut−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piut+1
piut
θpi
− 1
)
piut+1
piut
θpi
yut+1
yut
]
(1.36)
where mcit =
P I,it
P it
, defines the real marginal cost in terms of the sectoral final goods price.
Here we assume that shadow sector goods producers have limited market power. The above
equations represent the Rotemberg version of non-linear NKPCs that relate sectoral current
inflation to future expected inflation and to the level of relative outputs. The following equations
respectively allow to identify the sectoral price levels and the inflation rate for the consumption
price index:
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (1.37)
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Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (1.38)
Pt = pitPt−1 (1.39)
where Pt is defined by equation (1.5).
1.2.5 Monetary Policy
We close the model by describing a simple structure for the monetary policy rule. The Central
bank is assumed to follow a pure inflation targeting rule and set a standard Taylor-type
monetary policy instrument so that the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to the
movement in inflation gap with interest rate smoothing. The policy rule is characterised by the
following Taylor rule:
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (1.40)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate, ρR is interest rate smoothing parameter, µpi denotes
Taylor coefficient in response to inflation gap8 with εRt denoting monetary policy shock, which
is a standard i.i.d innovation. In this context, the monetary policy shock is thought of as
unexpected deviation of the nominal interest rate via Taylor rule at period t. The exogenous
shock to monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as εRt . The central bank supplies the
money demanded by the household to support the desired nominal interest rate.
1.2.6 Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
The labour market is in equilibrium when the demand for labour services by goods producers
equal the differentiated labour services supplied by households at the various wage rates.
Similarly, the market for physical capital is in equilibrium when the demand for capital services
by goods producers equals the capital produced in each sector at the market rental rate which
is used for investments. We note here that in the Rotemberg model, the aggregate resource
constraint takes the price adjustment cost into account which creates an inefficiency between
output and consumption. Therefore, aggregate resource constraint in each sector is defined as:9
yit = c
i
t + i
i
t + a(u
i
t)k¯
i
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piit
piit−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yit (1.41)
The last two terms of the equations represent household’s capital utilisation cost and goods
producers price adjustment cost. Letting Θit =
[
1 − κp2
(
piit
piit−1
θpi
− 1
)2]−1
and solving for yit,
8That is, deviation of inflation rate from the inflation target.
9In the Rotemberg model, the cost of nominal rigidities, i.e. the adjustment cost, creates a wedge between
aggregate consumption and aggregate output, because part of the output goes in the price adjustment cost. If
trend inflation is zero, this wedge vanishes and the model is equivalent up to Calvo mechanism up to first-order.
See Ascari and Rossi (2011).
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we obtain sectoral aggregate resource constraint as:
yit = Θ
i
t
[
cit + i
i
t + a(u
i
t)k¯
i
t−1
]
The aggregate consumption is given by equation (1.2) and aggregation labour constraint is
computed as follows:
lt = l
o
t + l
u
t (1.42)
Following Colombo et al. (2016), we introduce into the model the relative size of the shadow
sector (SHt) which will be useful when deriving the steady states of the model. From the
sectoral resource constraint, SHt is obtained from a straight forward manipulations using (1.3)
and (1.4) as:
SHt =
yut
yot
(1.43)
1.3 Model Dynamics and Results
In this section, we calibrate the theoretical DSGE model derived in the previous section for
developing and low-income countries by imposing several structural shocks. The aim is to show
how our model is coherent to the new Keynesian DSGE models and to highlight the role played
by the informal sector on the economy’s dynamics. We do so by examining the various channels
and explain their practical relevance to developing and low-income economies.
The equations listed in the previous section represent agents’ behaviour and identities that
altogether form the non-linear system. These include the first order conditions of households
with capital accumulation and investment adjustment cost, intermediate goods producers, final
goods producers, agents’ budget constraints, the monetary policy rule and equations describing
the exogenous processes driving the economy. The current set up involves five exogenous
processes in the official sector namely the risk premium shock, investment specific shock,
total factor productivity, price mark-up shock and the conventional monetary policy shock.
In order to find the solution of the model, we start by focusing on the symmetric equilibrium
for prices and quantities, then derive all the log-linearised equations of the model by taking
log-linear approximations around the steady state.10 The linearised DSGE model involves two
equations for output inflation in both sectors of the economy. The main difference between these
equations is that, the official sector output inflation equation is subject to the price mark-up
shock while shadow sector goods producers have limited market power and structural shocks
are asymmetrical to the official sector. The coefficients of the log-linear model depend on the
10The full set of the first order conditions and log-linearised equations are in the appendix.
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primitive parameters of the model as well as steady state values of the variables. We further
use the steady state conditions of the model to solve out for number of parameters.
1.3.1 Model Calibrations and Parameterization
The structural parameters of the model are taken in correspondence with developing and low-
income countries averages. The conventions in the model calibrations consist of parameters
values mostly borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Colombo et al. (2016) and
most current literature with similar modelling structure. This would serve as references when
assessing the dynamics of some key macroeconomic variables. They are selected in order to
capture specific ratios in the steady state and for most developing and low-income economies as
close as possible. Parameters whose information relates to developing countries are calibrated
using values and data from the developing countries literature. The complete list of parameters
and their values are in table (1.1).
Parameters characterizing the household’s preferences are fairly standard. The subjective
discount factor β, is set to 0.99 which is consistent with Smets and Wouters (2007), the same
value was used in Colombo et al. (2016) to achieve an annual steady state interest rate of
4%. The elasticity of substitution between official and informal consumption bundles is set at
c = 1.5 as was described in Batini et al. (2011). We set the steady state share of shadow
economy at SH = 0.47, a value common to several developing and low-income countries to
obtain the value for official consumption goods bias ϕc as in Colombo et al. (2016); and Khan
and Khan (2011). The coefficient of Frisch elasticity of substitution for labour supply in the
utility function is fixed at φ = 2, a value consistent with the posterior mean reported by Smets
and Wouters (2007). The steady state elasticity of capital utilisation cost parameter τ is fixed
at 0.2696 to indicate a mean of 0.2 for the capital utilisation cost function as suggested by
King and Rebelo (2000). The elasticity of the cost of adjusting investment is also fixed at
$ = 6.0144 to be as close as the value estimated by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003). Turning to the goods producer’s structural parameters for both sectors, from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we take the price elasticity of demand for differentiated goods
parameter o = 6, a value consistent with a 20% price mark up in the official sector and the
shadow sector value is set at u = 20 which also implies a 5% price mark up. The degree
of inflation indexation parameter is set to θpi = 1 to indicates a full indexation of inflation.
The degree of price stickiness parameter is fixed at κp = 4.37. Available literature suggests no
evidence of nominal rigidities in the shadow sector, therefore the benchmark values for inflation
indexation and degree of price stickiness are set in accordance with the official sector values. The
depreciation rate is set to equal to δ = 0.025 per quarter which implies an annual depreciation
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Table 1.1: Model calibration parameters.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount rate
φ 2 Frisch elasticity of substitution for labour
c 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between official
and unofficial consumption
o 6 Official sector price elasticity of demand
u 20 Shadow sector price elasticity of demand
κp 4.37 Degree of price stickiness
θpi 1 Inflation indexation
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation
αo 0.36 Official sector’s capital Share
αu 0.28 Shadow sector’s capital Share
ρR 0.9 Interest rate smoothing parameter
µpi 1.5 Taylor coefficient to inflation gap
ρA 0.8 Productivity shock autocorrelation
ρp 0.8 Innovation to price markup shock
ρRISK 0.7 Innovation to risk premium shock
ρINV 0.85 Innovation to investment shock
ρε 0.2 Innovation to interest rate Shock
on capital equal to 10%. We additionally set the official sector capital share to αo = 0.36 to
capture a high capital intensity in the official sector than the informal sector. The informal
sector firm’s capital share parameter is calibrated to capture a relatively low capital intensity
in their production function, so we choose a capital share of αu = 0.28 as in Koreshkova (2006).
This is in line with data from many developing and low-income countries where most of their
production activities are labour intensive.
The conventional parameters characterizing the monetary policy instrument are set accordingly
as: the Taylor rule interest smoothing rate parameter ρR = 0.9 and inflation gap parameter
µpi = 1.5. The parameters describing the shock processes are calibrated as follows, innovation
to interest rate shock ρε = 0.2 is set to account for the temporal shock to monetary policy as
reported by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), the persistence of technology shock ρA = 0.8,
and the persistence to price mark-up shock is also set at ρp = 0.8. Similarly, the persistence
to investment and risk premium shock parameters are respectively set at ρINV = 0.85 and
ρRISK = 0.7. To achieve a stable steady state, we conventionally set the aggregate labour
supply to 0.25. It is paramount to note that, the steady state relative prices are determined by
the supply side effects of the model, namely mark ups and technological parameters. Bearing
this in mind, the price of shadow sector goods is always relatively higher due to the high cost of
capital. The rest of steady state values are calibrated using the assumptions and the structural
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parameters.
1.3.2 Analysis and Discussion of Results
In this section, we analyse and discusses the various impulse response functions (IRFs) regarding
some key macroeconomic variables using the baseline calibration to asymmetric shocks in
the official sector. Figures (1.1)-(1.5) represent the various responses following productivity,
investment specific shock, price mark-up, risk-premium and monetary policy shocks to the
official sector. We further analyse how those shocks transmit into the shadow sector and finally
analyse how the presence of shadow sector affects the economy at large. We note here that,
variables are already expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state values and the
continuous red lines in the figures represent the behaviour of shocks in one sector (official)
economy as in Smets and Wouters (2003) while the continuous blue line defines the behaviour
of variables in the two sector (both official and shadow) economy. The baseline calibration
results in the current set up are in line with the existing New Keynesian DSGE models with
two sectors and we describe them accordingly.
Figure (1.1) shows that following a positive technological shock to official sector considering the
model without shadow sector (the red line), output, consumption, investment, real wage and
capital demand rise and labour employment falls. The fall in labour employment indicates a
much stronger effect of the shock on the model without shadow sector. The main qualitative
difference when we introduce shadow sector (the blue line) is the rise in both official and shadow
sector labour employment and decline in the shadow sector real wage. The reason being that
the productivity shock raises the product wage in the official sector and lowers the official
sector price level. The lower interest rate raises total consumption demand and consumption of
shadow sector goods whose price increases which also explains the fall in the shadow product
wage. Moreover, demand for official goods is much stronger in the model with shadow sector
because the relative price of official goods falls which also explains why official sector labour
employment increases, the transmission of the productivity shock is now positive across sectors.
Turning to investment specific shock, figure (1.2) shows that a positive investment shock
increases labour employment in the official sector which induces a rise in output and a fall
in consumption in either models (with and without shadow economy). We note here that the
presence of the shadow sector amplifies the impact of the shock on the official sector. An
important difference is the fall in product wage in the official sector which results from the
rise in official sector price levels. The higher interest rate reduces aggregate consumption and
shadow consumption goods thereby increasing investment. This mechanism explains the rise
in shadow sector product wage. In response to official sector price mark-up shock, our results
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replicate what is in most DSGE literature as shown by figure (1.3). The responses from the
model without shadow sector indicate a fall in official sector consumption, investment, labour
employment, real wages, real returns on capital and output. A major discrepancy with the
introduction of shadow sector is the rise in official product wage which is attributed to the lower
levels of the official sector prices. The increase in shadow sector labour employment is as a result
of the impact of the shock which lowers shadow sector product wage and price levels. As shadow
sector labour employment increases with a falling aggregate inflation, demand for shadow sector
goods increases. Figure (1.4) represents the IRFs for a positive risk premium shock to the official
sector, output, consumption, investment, labour employment, capital demand and real returns
on capital fall as expected. The same results are replicated in the official sector when we
introduce the informal sector except shadow sector labour employment which rises and shadow
sector product wage declines. This occurs because the shock raises official sector product wage
and lowers official sector price levels. With higher levels of interest rate total consumption
declines and the fall in shadow prices raise shadow consumption. This explains the fall in the
shadow sector product wage. The reduction in price of capital raises capital utilization and
capital demand in the shadow sector thereby increasing real returns from capital.
Table 1.2: Transmission effects of expansionary shocks in official sector to the shadow sector.
Shocks Official Output Shadow Output
Monetary policy - +
Risk premium - +
Price mark-up - +
Investment specific + -
Total factor productivity + +
Note: (-) Negative transmission effect, (+) Positive transmission effects.
Following a tightening of the monetary policy in the official sector which increases the nominal
interest rate, figure (1.5) shows that output, consumption, investment, capital demand, labour
employment, real wage and inflation decrease in the model without shadow sector. The
difference with the introduction of shadow economy is the rise in official sector product wage
which is attributed to the lower official sector price levels. The shock raises interest rate which
gives the hump-shaped fall in official sector output. The decline in official consumption is a
rational behaviour since households’ substitute consumption for investment in government bond
whereas private investment in the official sector firms declines due to higher interest rate.11
However, policy impact on the shadow economy is somewhat asymmetrical which happens
because of sectoral price elasticity of demand making shadow prices relatively more flexible.
From the various signs shown on table (1.2), we can conclude here that shadow sector indeed
11See Batini et al. (2011) for further discussions.
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serves as a buffer to the shocks considered in this analysis. As indicated on table (1.2), the
negative transmission effects of monetary policy, risk premium and price mark-up shocks in the
official sector are assimilated by the informal sector with a diametric response. On the other
hand, positive investment specific shock transmissions in the formal sector triggers a negative
reaction in the shadow sector while the total factor productivity shock induces positive effects
in both sectors of the economy.
1.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Deriving a meaningful closed-form solution for the size of the shadow sector SH is complex
given the kind of model we have built. We therefore perform sensitivity analysis on the size
value of SH to changes in technological parameter (αi) and in relative price mark-ups (i) to
understand transmission processes of the model in relation to the size of the shadow sector. We
do so by calibrating the value of ϕc at the values consistent with two alternative shares of the
shadow economy: one characterised by a high share of the shadow economy (SH = 0.47 a value
for several developing and low-income countries) as the baseline model and one characterised
by a low share of the shadow economy (SH = 0.10 an average value for advanced countries).
We do this exercise to ascertain the changing effects of the size of shadow economy and its
importance to the model. In the appendix we show that in steady state:12
SH =
yus
yos
=
1− ϕc
ϕc
(
Pus
P os
)−c (1− iosyos )
(1− iusyus )
=
SH =
1− ϕc
ϕc
(( u−1
u
) 1
1−αu
(
rk,os
αo
) αo
1−αo
(1− αu)(
o−1
o
) 1
1−αo
(
rk,us
αu
) αu
1−αu
(1− αo)
)c(1− δ( 1β−(1−δ)αo ))(
1− δ
(
1
β−(1−δ)
αu
))
The relative size of shadow sector is obtained by substituting equations (1.3) and (1.4) into
equation (1.41) for the solution at (1.43) through a straight forward manipulation. Following
this exercise, an increase in the shadow sector retail price mark-ups unambiguously reduce the
size of the shadow sector and official sector consumption goods bias parameter which affects
the relative goods prices. We must emphasise that relative prices are entirely determined by
supply side effects of the model namely mark-ups and technology parameters. In fact with the
same price elasticity of demand (o = u) in both sectors, we obtain an identical results and
responses equivalent to the benchmark model. The relatively high cost of capital makes the
price of shadow goods always relatively higher and for that matter when we increase the shadow
sector technology parameter to the level of official sector parameter (αo = αu), the value of SH
12The complete steady state derivation of SH is in the appendix.
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proportionally doubles with official goods bias and the price of shadow goods becomes relatively
lower. This strengthens the argument that consumption wages do not necessarily matter for
the determination of relative prices but technological parameters greatly have the effects of
adversely changing the relative price of goods and capital in the shadow sector. It also explains
how marginal cost with the same technology becomes identical with higher mark-ups in the
formal sector. The results from the sensitivity analysis indicate that the size of shadow sector
has a greater influence on the shadow sector relative goods prices.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced and extended to the new Keynesian DSGE model of Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) with the shadow economy mainly to ascertain the role they play in
the transmission of several macroeconomic shocks. This was motivated by the current debate
on informal economy’s activities which are not under the regulatory purview of policy makers.
Households are shown to be standard with all households consuming from the same basket of
goods and services and also supplying labour services to both sectors of the economy. There
are perfect competitive goods producers operating in both sectors as well as monopolistic
competitive final goods producers. We finally close the model with a Central bank which
implement monetary policy instruments. The macroeconomic properties of our variables, its
directions and the transmission pattern with respect to all the shocks are theoretically sound
and match the patterns reported in the existing conventional new Keynesian DSGE models
with shadow sectors. Our calibrated model showed that the presence of informal markets with
asymmetric shock to the official sector induces factor flow across sectors and crowding-out of
formal sector’s activities into the shadow sector when there are negative transmissions of the
shock to the formal sector. This strengthens the existing notion that shadow sector serves as a
cyclical buffer. A sensitivity analysis with changes in technology and price mark-up parameters
indicated that the size of shadow sector has an influence on shadow sector relative goods prices.
The results suggest that shadow economy play important role in channelling shocks into the
real sectors of the economy.
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Figure 1.5: Response to Monetary Policy Shock
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CHAPTER 2
Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy shocks and feedbacks in a
DSGE model with Shadow Economy in Developing
Countries.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, we have witnessed the development of a new version of macroeconomic
modelling - new Keynesian DSGE models - that explicitly builds on microfounded literature.
The advancement in this estimation methodology allows for estimating variants of models
that are able to compete with more standard time-series models. Given the microfounded
nature of DSGE models, it particularly become suitable for evaluating the effects of alternative
macroeconomic policies. However, most literature on DSGE models have largely focused on
using variants of the new Keynesian DSGE models in analysing the effects of monetary policy
transmissions on other macroeconomic variables. In fact, most benchmark models such as
Christiano et al. (2005); Smet and Wouters (2003, 2007), provided evidence showing that an
optimisation-based model with nominal and real frictions could account for the effects of a
monetary policy shocks.1 Most of these benchmark DSGE models have sometimes paid little
or no attention to the role played by fiscal policy thereby minimising any possible interaction
of fiscal policies with monetary policy transmissions. The aftermath of the recent financial
crisis saw a large scale of fiscal policy responses in most advanced economies which led to a
sizeable increase in fiscal deficits and debt levels (Coenen, 2012). The paradigm shift was due
to the inability of monetary policy to avoid the recession making fiscal tools an important and
debatable topic in macroeconomic policy modelling. Fiscal expansion particularly became large
in the US and in the UK whilst many governments in the Euro area were criticized by the IMF
for taking slow actions in the 2007-2009 period and for the "austerity" measures that were
imposed onto peripheral countries after the beginning of the Greek crisis in 2010 (Krugman,
2012; Stiglitz et al., 2014). Following this, vast majority of DSGE literature have discussed the
role of fiscal policies on macroeconomic variables and its determination on the real business
cycle.
1Other benchmark DSGE models include Bernanke et al., (1999); Kiyotaki and Moore, (1997); Iacoviello,
(2005); Christiano et al., (2003, 2008); Goodfriend and McCallum, (2007).
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Real business cycle models seem not to suit the study of government spending effects due to
its frictionless nature. Theoretical RBC models predict that increase in government spendings
crowd out the private consumption and reduces the real wage. In this regard, Baxter and
King (1993) showed that an increase in public expenditure bring about a direct increase in
the discounted future value of taxes as government need to finance its intertemporal budget.
This lead to the negative wealth effects on households which reduces private consumption,
increase in labour supply and output and a fall in real wage in RBC models. Perotti et al.
(2007) reviewed this literature and delivered results that are generally consistent with RBC
models and argued that the response of private consumption to government spending shock
is positive which leaves the debate on effects of fiscal policy shock unsettled. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1992), Ramsey and Shapiro (1998) and Cavallo (2005) found that increases
in government spending for national defence reduce private consumption, the real wage and
increase employment as well as nonresidential investments. New Keynesian paradigm which
mainly include real frictions and normal rigidities to RBC framework displays the same wealth-
effects mechanism that entails a reduction in private consumption and expansion in labour
supply following a government spending shock (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Linnemann and
Schabert, 2003). However, in the new Keynesian paradigm real wages may increase due to
an outward shift of the labour demand induced by the expansion of demand with sticky
prices as in Forni et al. (2009). They typically predicted that an increase in government
expenditure will increase labour demand, generating an increase in the real wage and output.
The response of private consumption is mainly determined by the negative wealth effect induced
by increase in government spending (see, e.g., Linnemann and Schaubert, 2003); and "rule-of-
thumb" consumers must also be present to generate an increase in private consumption as in
Gali et al. (2007). Indeed, Kumhof and Laxton (2007) have developed a very comprehensive
model for the analysis of fiscal policies, which incorporates four non-Ricardian features. In
their analysis of the effects of a permanent increase in the US fiscal deficits and debt, they
find medium and long-term effects that differ significantly from those of liquidity constrained
agents. Furthermore, they find deficits to have a significant effect on the current account. Pappa
(2009) studied the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labour market by employing a prototype
RBC and new Keynesian model with structural vectoral autoregressive (VAR) model predicted
that shocks to government consumption, investment and employment must raise output and
deficit. In effects, shocks to government consumption and investment increased real wages and
employment simultaneously, however, the dynamics of employment shocks were mix. Other
standard empirical version of the new Keynesian DSGE model also typically predict a positive
or at least no significant negative response of private consumption to government spending
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shocks (as in Perotti, 2002; Fatàs and Mihov, 2001; Canzoneri et al., 2002; Mountford and Ulig,
2001). Most of these theoretical and empirical literature that analyse the impact of fiscal policy
on economic activities focus mainly on the size and sensitivity of fiscal multipliers as in Cogan
et al. (2010); Christiano et al. (2011); and Coenen (2012) without the consideration of the
shadow sector. Standard DSGE literature like the ones introduced above lack the prerequisite
modelling ingredients for most developing and emerging countries which makes replications of
such models in the developing countries questionable. The adoption of such model requires
a significant amount of altercations to be coherent with relevant micro evidence. It therefore
becomes erroneous to implement the same DSGE models built for the advanced economies for
the developing economies without the necessary considerations.2 The informal sector forms an
integral part of many economies in the world and are of larger proportions in most developing
and emerging economies. However, most DSGE models neglect the role played by informal
sectors in affecting macroeconomic transmission processes (except Arouba, 2010; Batini et al.,
2011; Khan and Khan, 2011; Colombo et al., 2016 on financial crisis). On the other hand,
DSGE literature which model fiscal policy instruments and stimulus such as Pappa (2009),
Christiano et al. (2011), Coenen (2012, 2013) and Albonico et al. (2016) all do not include the
shadow sector despite their role in the transmission process.
In this work, we investigate the role of fiscal policies over aggregate business cycle in the
presence of shadow economy. In effect, we seek to elucidate whether the presence of shadow
economy dampens or amplifies the effects of fiscal policy transmissions. Secondly, we try to
identify the role of alternative fiscal shocks and feedbacks on GDP by comparing the cases
with and without shadow economy. A major policy elaboration is whether government should
target the participation rate with fiscal policies or whether government should implicitly target
sectoral relative prices. In order to do this, we follow Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and
introduce shadow sector to ascertain their role in transmitting fiscal policy shocks. The main
difference between the two sectors concern the calibrations of technology and price mark-ups.
Fiscal policy packages are computed as an average effective tax rates on labour income, capital
income and consumption tax following Melina et al. (2016) which are consistent with data
collected by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation in 2005-06. On the expenditure
side, we take into consideration the variable mostly used in the literature, that is the government
consumption from National Income data which includes both purchases of goods and services
as well as compensations to government employees as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). The
model is characterised by a competitive labour market where firms in the two sectors pay the
2The reason being that, most developing countries are characterised by weak financial sector, existence of
large informal sector, external shock vulnerability, and weak economic and political institutions. The challenge
of data inconsistency and unavailability in most developing and low-income countries also become a problem.
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same consumption real wage. This assumption is motivated by the theoretical contributions
from Amaral and Quintin (2006); Pratap and Quintin (2006) and supported by Maloney (1999,
2004). The contributions by Pratap and Quintin (2006) on developing countries provided
evidence against labour market segmentation and suggested that labour market arguments are
not necessary to account for the silent features of labour market in developing countries. Our
model features a number of real (adjustment cost in investment and utilization rate of capital)
and nominal (price adjustment) frictions that appear to be necessary to capture the empirical
persistence in the main macroeconomic data which have become quite standard in the DSGE
literature. Smets and Wouters (2007) model exhibits both sticky nominal prices and wages that
adjust following a Calvo mechanism but we deviate from that and model goods producer’s prices
using Rotemberg (1982) model with full indexation of prices.3 Our model also incorporates a
variable capital utilisation rate which tends to smooth the adjustment of the rental rate of capital
in response to changes in output. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the cost of adjusting the
utilisation rate is expressed in terms of consumption goods and the cost of adjusting the capital
stock is modelled as a function of the changes in investment, rather than the level of investments.
The model introduces several structural shocks that are asymmetric to the formal sector which
include government spending shock, labour income tax shock and capital income tax shock. We
further provide estimates of output multipliers for the alternative fiscal instruments from both
models (with and without shadow economy) to highlight what happens to the multipliers when
we incorporate a shadow economy relative to the benchmark case of one sector economy (without
shadow economy). In each case, we consider the longrun and the shortrun multiplier effects of
fiscal policy instrument on real GDP. Key finding from our multiplier computations indicate
that both shortrun and longrun tax multipliers are typically smaller than one in absolute
value than government spending multipliers. Moreover, the introduction of shadow economy
further weakens the size of government expenditure multiplier and strengthens the adverse
labour and capital tax multipliers. These happen because fiscal multipliers are determined by
the private sector’s responses to fiscal shocks, generating a spill-over effects onto the shadow
sector. The effects of relative consumption prices and factor inputs prices together determines
the reallocation of labour and capital into the informal sector. More broadly, our multiplier
computations are related to a large and growing set of studies that examine the size of fiscal
multipliers within a two-sector macroeconomic models. Most recent and prominent examples
include Basile et al. (2016), Pappa et al. (2015), Hayat et al. (2016) and Junior et al.
(forthcoming).4
3In fact, Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) followed a partial indexation of prices.
4Other fiscal multiplier literature within the single sector model include Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et
al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011).
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows, section 2 provides an overview of the
model, while section 3 reports on the parameters and steady state ratios used for calibrating
the model, presents the results and some sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The framework of our model is very close to Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007); and Albonico
et al. (2016) with the main difference being the introduction of the shadow economy. The
model is characterised by households, intermediate goods producers and final goods producers
operating in each sector of the economy. It is then completed by the standard Central Bank
and government fiscal instruments. Households are standard and maximise the utility function
over a time horizon, supply the same level of labour services to goods producers in each
sector. We do not explicitly model the financial sector, however, as argued in Justiniano et
al. (2011), investment specific shocks may be interpreted as a proxy for more fundamental
disturbances to the functioning of the financial sector. Households wealth is accumulated by
purchasing government bonds and investment in firms; they also decide on how much capital
to accumulate based on the capital adjustment cost and capital utilisation. The intermediate
goods producers supply their intermediate goods to final goods producers who differentiate
and repackage them into final goods for households’ consumption. Households and goods
producers face nominal and real frictions, which have been identified as important in generating
empirically plausible dynamics. Real frictions are introduced through generalised adjustment
costs in investment, variable capacity utilisation and nominal frictions arise from staggered
price-setting la Rotemberg (1982), along with full dynamic indexation of price contracts. In
addition, there exist financial frictions in the form of domestic risk premium and investment
specific shock. Specifically, final goods producers in both sectors are able to reset their prices ala
Rotemberg (1982) model. We postulate the central banks to follow strictly inflation targeting
policy and finally, we capture the fiscal feedback rules by introducing consumption tax, labour
and capital income taxes which are used by the government to finance its expenditure.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure unity who supply labour services to firms.
Households are made up of individuals who consume, work in both sectors of the economy
and return the wages they earn to the household. Households supply the same amount of
undifferentiated labour services to each sector of the economy thereby setting their real wages
to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour supplied. Their savings
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and investment are made through purchasing of government bonds and supplying of capital to
sectoral goods producers. Following earlier contributions by (Merz 1995; Andolfatto 1996) we
assume that household members perfectly share the risk of sectoral consumption so individuals
consumption decisions are the same and independent from their working conditions. The
lifetime utility of representative agents is characterised by:
U it = Et
∞∑
n=0
βn
{
ln(ct+n)− χl
i(1+φ)
t
1 + φ
}
(2.1)
where χ is the parameter that regulates the disutility of work and φ defines the Frisch elasticity
of labour. For each sector, household members, own goods producers, hold physical capital
and choose their investment to both sectors. Households can increase the supply of rental
services from capital by investing in additional capital taking into account the adjustment cost
of capital. Their intertemporal budget constraint is:5
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where Bt is government bond that pays one unit of currency in period t− 1 and Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate. We define a number of sectoral variables: the relative goods prices P it ,
the capital kit (where a bar on top of capital indicates physical units of capital), labour services
lit, the returns on capital r
k,i
t , the utilisation rate of capital uit, Πit represent the profit received
from investment in goods production and product wage wit. The term a(uit) defines the real
cost of using the capital stock with intensity uit. The fiscal authority makes net lump-sum taxes
Tt which allows to deal with debt accumulation, and finances its expenditures by issuing bonds
and by levying taxes on labour income τwt and capital income τkt . εRISKt is the risk premium
shock on the returns to bonds that affects the intertemporal margin, creating a wedge between
the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the households,
which follows an AR(1) stochastic process with an i.i.d error term given as:
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (2.3)
5Here we ignore superscript i.
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Households’ stock of physical capital in each sector is driven by the standard dynamic equation
for capital given respectively as:
k¯ot+1 = (1− δ)k¯ot + εINVt
[
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)]
iot (2.4)
k¯ut+1 = (1− δ)k¯ut +
[
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)]
iut (2.5)
where S(.) introduces the investment adjustment cost function.6 δ is the depreciation rate and
only capital used in period uitk¯it is subject to depreciation. εINVt is the stochastic shock to the
price of investment relative to consumption goods and follows an exogenous process with an
i.i.d. error term as:
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (2.6)
Households in addition choose the utilisation rate of capital with the amount of effective capital
in each sector given as:7
kit = u
i
tk¯
i
t−1 (2.7)
Households consumption basket ct is described as CES aggregate over the two sectors
consumption bundle:
ct =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cut )
c−1
c
] c
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Furthermore, each ct is also defined as:
ct =
(∫ 1
0
c
i
(
i−1
i
)
t dz
i
) i
i−1
where ϕc indicates official sector consumption goods bias and c > 1 is the measure of elasticity
of substitution between official consumption (cot ) and unofficial consumption (cut ) bundles
whereas i > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods that
form ct. Minimizing total consumption expenditure subject to the consumption bundle given
above yields the following demand function for each good:8
cot = ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
Pt
)−c
ct (2.9)
6The investment adjustment cost function is given by:
S
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κI
2
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)2
In the steady state, S(1) = S′(1) = 0, S′′(1) > 0 ≡ $ with $ being the adjustment cost parameter.
7In the steady state, utilisation cost function implies that: uis = 1 and a(1) = 0.
8In the official sector, consumption tax drives a wedge between final goods price set by firms and the
corresponding consumption price.
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cut = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
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where τ c is a consumption tax levied by the government on official sector consumption goods
to finance its expenditure. The aggregate consumption price index is given as:
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (2.11)
In a symmetric way, we assume wages obtained by households from supplying labour services
to be flexible in both sectors, thus labour market equilibrium requires that the marginal rate
of substitution between total labour supplied to each sector equals the wage.9
Households face the usual maximization problem of maximizing their expected discounted sum
of instantaneous utility (2.1) subject to equations (2.2), (2.4), (2.5) and (2.7). Letting λt
denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the household’s budget constraint and λtQit the Lagrange
multiplier for the capital accumulation equations whereby Qit is the Tobin’s q which is equal to
one when there are no capital adjustment cost. It can be interpreted as the one unit shadow
relative price of capital with respect to one unit of consumption. The first order conditions
with respect to consumption (ct), government bond (Bt), sectoral labour (lit), sectoral capital
(k¯it+1), sectoral investment (iit) and capital utilisation (uit) are respectively given given below.10
The intertemporal marginal utility of consumption is:
Uc,t = λt =
1
ct
(2.12)
The consumption Euler equation from government bond is:
λt = ε
RISK
t RtβEt
λt+1
pit+1
(2.13)
In competitive labour market, the standard labour supply conditions hold as:
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χloφt
λt
(2.14)
Put
Pt
wut =
χluφt
λt
(2.15)
The arbitrage condition in the labour market ensures that both sectors pay the same level of
9See Gali (2008). The labour market equilibrium requires that wit = mrs
i
t, where mrst = −U il,t/U ic,t is the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour supplied in period t+n for the households. This
means that the official and shadow sector would pay the same consumption wage to workers.
10A detailed derivations of all the first order conditions are available upon request.
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real wage as:
P ot
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Put
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The competitive capital supplied to each sector is accordingly given as:
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The first order conditions for investments supplied to each sector is given as:
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And finally, the following equations also gives the first order conditions for effective capital
utilised:
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (2.21)
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (2.22)
solving equations (2.12) and (2.13) for ct we obtain the consumption Euler equation.
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
In each sector i ∈ (o, u), goods producers produce intermediate goods and sell them at the
competitive intermediate price P I,it to final goods producers. The production function for a
representative firm is given as:
yit = A
i
tk
i(αi)
t l
i(1−αi)
t (2.23)
where yit, kit and lit respectively denote sectoral output, capital and labour inputs. αi is the
sectoral capital share used in productive activities. Aot is the official sector productivity shock
which is defined as an AR(1) process with i.i.d error term as:
lnAot = ρ
AlnAot−1 + ξ
A
t (2.24)
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Goods producers in each sector maximize their market value by choosing labour (lit) and capital
(kit) taking into account their production output level. Their market value (Πit) is expressed as:
Πit =
P I,it
Pt
[
yit − witlit − rk,it kit
]
(2.25)
where wit and r
k,i
t are respectively sectoral real wage rate and real returns from capital.
P I,it
Pt
yit
represent the firm’s revenue from selling output and P
I,i
t
Pt
(witl
i
t+r
k,i
t k
i
t) are the repayments made
by goods producers to households which consist of the wage bill and cost of physical capital.
The following equations respectively define the first order conditions for sectoral labour and
capital:
wit = (1− αi)Ait
(
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)αi
(2.26)
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This implies a capital-labour ratio given as:
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Solving equations (2.26) and (2.27) yield sectoral real marginal cost as:
mcI,it =
(
rk,it
αi
)αi(
wit
1− αi
)1−αi
(2.29)
2.2.3 Final Goods Producers
We assume a sticky price specification based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment cost in
both sectors of the economy. We index their prices to a combination of both current and past
inflation with a weight equal to θpi. The final goods producers maximize their profit function
by choosing their final goods prices taking into account the quadratic adjustment cost given as:
κp
2
(
piit
piit−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yit
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost in adjusting its
nominal prices that can be measured in terms of the final goods with κp being the price stickiness
parameter which accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer-firm relation
and θpi representing the price indexation parameter.
The official sector final goods producers are subject to price mark-up shocks, hence in a
symmetric equilibrium, the Rotemberg version of non-linear New Keynesian Phillips Curve
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(NKPC) is derived as:
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where ot is now a stochastic parameter which determines the time-varying mark-up in the official
goods markets. As in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), the official sector final goods producers’
actual mark-up hovers around its desired level over time. This desired level comprises of an
endogenous and exogenous components which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process given as:
lnot = ln
o + lnεpt
lnεpt = ρ
plnεpt−1 + ξ
p
t (2.31)
with ξpt being an i.i.d. normal innovation term. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price adjustment
rule satisfies the following first order condition for the shadow goods producers given as:
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
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(2.32)
where mcit =
P I,it
P it
, defines the real marginal cost in terms of the sectoral final goods price.
Here we assume shadow sector goods producers to have limited market power. The above
equations represent the Rotemberg version of non-linear NKPCs that relate sectoral current
inflation to future expected inflation and to the level of relative outputs. The following equations
respectively allow to identify the sectoral price levels and the inflation rate for the consumption
price index:
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (2.33)
Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (2.34)
Pt = pitPt−1 (2.35)
where Pt is defined by equation (2.11).
2.2.4 Government Policies
In this section we introduce and discuss the various government policies in regulating the real
sector. It comprises of the fiscal tools used by the government and a Central Bank who oversees
the implementation of monetary instruments.
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Fiscal Policy
The government supplies an exogenous amount of public goods (gt) which is defined in terms
of the official sector goods. Government expenditure is financed through the taxes (levied on
consumption goods, labour and capital income) and the issuance of one period nominally risk
free bonds. The government budget constraint is of the form:
gt +
Bt−1
P ot
= τwt w
o
t l
o
t + τ
k
t
[
rk,ot u
o
t − a(uot )− δ
]
k¯ot + τ
ccot +
Bt
P ot Rt
+ Tt (2.36)
where Tt are lump-sum taxes which also appear in the household’s budget constraint and it
explicitly ensures solvency in government deficit. Government spending (gt) follows a stochastic
process with i.i.d. error term given as:11
lngt = ρ
Glngt−1 + ξGt (2.37)
As an illustration of the fiscal rules on the revenue side, we set fiscal rules for labour and capital
income taxes to follow an AR(1) process given respectively as:12
lnτWt = ρ
W lnτWt−1 + ξ
W
t (2.38)
lnτKt = ρ
K lnτKt−1 + ξ
K
t (2.39)
where both ξWt and ξKt represent their respective error term defined as an i.i.d.
Monetary Policy
We close the model by describing a simple structure for the monetary policy rule. The Central
bank is assumed to follow a pure inflation targeting rule and set a standard Taylor-type
monetary policy instrument so that the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to the
movement in inflation gap with interest rate smoothing. The policy rule is characterised by the
following Taylor rule:
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (2.40)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate, ρR is interest rate smoothing parameter, µpi denotes
Taylor coefficient in response to inflation gap13 with εRt denoting monetary policy shock, with a
11In the steady state, we impose that gs
yos
= g¯s in order to obtain the public consumption-output ratio.
12See Coenen et al. (2012, 2013) for similar discussions. Here we do not necessarily consider feedback on
debt and output but we assume the economy to react to fiscal shocks. Albonico et al. (2016) argued that
a more restricted model without the feedbacks is better specified than models with fiscal reaction functions.
Therefore, by considering fiscal shocks the model stability is obtained because the implicit lump-sum taxation
ensures government solvency. We later consider feedback on output (automatic stabilizer) as a sensitivity test.
13That is, deviation of inflation rate from the inflation target.
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standard i.i.d innovation. In this context, the monetary policy shock is thought of as unexpected
deviation of the nominal interest rate via Taylor rule at period t. The exogenous shock to
monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as εRt . The central bank supplies money
demanded by household to support the desired nominal interest rate.
2.2.5 Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraints are given respectively as:14
yot = c
o
t + i
o
t + gt + a(u
o
t )k¯
o
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yot (2.41)
yut = c
u
t + i
u
t + a(u
u
t )k¯
u
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yut (2.42)
The last two terms of each equation represent household’s capital utilisation cost and goods
producers price adjustment cost. The aggregate consumption is given by equation (2.8) and
aggregation labour constraint is computed as follows:
lt = l
o
t + l
u
t (2.43)
Following Colombo et al. (2016), we introduce into the model the relative size of the shadow
sector (SHt) which will be useful when deriving the steady states of the model. From the
sectoral resource constraints we obtain SHt as:15
SHt =
yut
yot
2.3 Model Dynamics and Results
In order to ascertain the role played by fiscal feedbacks in a DSGE model, we calibrate the
theoretical model in the previous section by focusing on fiscal impulses. The aim is to show
how our model is coherent to the new Keynesian DSGE models and to highlight the role
played by various fiscal packages in the presence of informal economy. We do so by examining
the various channels and factors which influence the dynamic properties of the model. The
benchmark simulation involves exogenous processes asymmetric to the official sector consisting
of government spending shock, labour and capital income tax shocks. The model is solved by
14We note here that, the official sector resource constraint incorporates the government expenditure.
15Through a straight forward manipulations using (2.9) and (2.10) we obtain steady state SH as:
SH =
yus
yos
=
1− ϕc
ϕc
(
Pus
P os (1 + τ
c)
)−c (1− ios/yos − gs)
(1− ius /yus )
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focusing on the constraints and first order conditions for prices and quantities, we then derive
all the log-linearised equations of the model by taking log-linear approximations around the
steady state.16 The coefficients of the log-linear model depend on the calibration parameters of
the model as well as steady state values and we further use the steady state conditions of the
model to solve out for number of other parameters.
2.3.1 Model Calibrations
The structural parameters of the model consist of parameter values mostly borrowed from Smets
and Wouters (2007) and Colombo et al. (2016). These parameters are selected in order to
capture specific ratios in the steady state of the model. Parameters whose information relates
to developing countries are calibrated using values and data from the developing countries
literature. Other parameters and steady state ratios are chosen to match values from the
developing countries, complete list of parameters and their values are in table (2.1).
Parameters characterizing the household’s preferences and the official sector firms are fairly
standard. The subjective discount factor β, is set to 0.99 which is consistent with Smets
and Wouters (2007), the same value was used in Colombo et al. (2016) to achieve an annual
steady state interest rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between official and informal
consumption bundles is set at c = 1.5 as was described in Batini et al. (2011). The coefficient
of Frisch elasticity of substitution for labour supply in the utility function is fixed at φ = 2, a
value consistent with the posterior mean reported by Smets and Wouters (2007). The steady
state elasticity of capital utilisation cost parameter τ is fixed at 0.2696 to indicate a mean of 0.2
for the capital utilisation cost function as suggested by King and Rebelo (2000). The elasticity
of the cost of adjusting investment is also fixed at $ = 6.0144 to be as close as the value
estimated by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003). In order to characterise
the empirical findings of the shadow sector in the developing countries, we set the steady state
share of the shadow economy SH = 0.47 (a value common to several developing and low-
income countries) to calibrate the value of official consumption goods bias ϕc at 0.54. Turning
to the goods producer’s structural parameters for both sectors, from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004), we take the price elasticity of demand for differentiated goods parameter o = 6, a value
consistent with a 20% price mark up in the official sector and the shadow sector value is set at
u = 20 which also implies a 5% price mark up. The degree of inflation indexation parameter is
set to θpi = 1 to indicates a full indexation of inflation. The degree of price stickiness parameter
is fixed at κp = 4.37. Available literature suggest no evidence of nominal rigidities in the shadow
sector, therefore the benchmark values for inflation indexation and degree of price stickiness
16The full set of the first order conditions, steady state derivations and log-linearised equations are presented
in the appendix.
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Table 2.1: Model calibration parameters.
Parameter Value Description
Preferences & Technology
β 0.99 Subjective discount rate
φ 2 Frisch elasticity of substitution for labour
c 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between official
and unofficial consumption
o 6 Official sector price elasticity of demand
u 20 Shadow sector price elasticity of demand
κp 4.37 Degree of price stickiness
θpi 1 Inflation indexation
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation
αo 0.36 Official sector’s capital Share
αu 0.28 Shadow sector’s capital Share
Monetary policy
ρR 0.9 Interest rate smoothing parameter
µpi 1.5 Taylor coefficient to inflation gap
Shock innovation
ρG 0.7 Innovation to government spending shock
ρW 0.8 Innovation to labour income tax shock
ρK 0.75 Innovation to capital income tax shock
are used for both sectors as in Colombo et al. (2016). The depreciation rate is set to equal
to δ = 0.025 per quarter which implies an annual depreciation on capital equal to 10%. We
additionally set the official sector capital share to αo = 0.36 to capture a high capital intensity
in the official sector than the informal sector. The informal sector firm’s capital share parameter
is calibrated to capture a relatively low capital intensity in their production function, so we
choose a capital share of αu = 0.28 as in Koreshkova (2006). The conventional parameters
Table 2.2: Fiscal policy steady state ratios.
Fiscal ratio Value Description
τ c 0.10 Consumption tax
τks 0.20 Capital income tax
τws 0.15 Labour income tax
g¯s 0.14 Government consumption
characterizing the monetary policy instrument are set accordingly as: the Taylor rule interest
smoothing rate parameter ρR = 0.9 and inflation gap parameter µpi = 1.5. The parameters
describing the shock processes are calibrated as follows, innovation to government spending
shock parameters is set at ρG = 0.7. Innovations to labour and capital income tax shocks are
set at ρW = 0.8 and ρK = 0.75 respectively. The ratios of fiscal variables to GDP and the
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steady state tax rates as shown on table (2.2) were taken from Melina et al. (2016) which are
consistent with data collected by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation in 2005-06
for developing countries. The steady state values for τ c, τks , and τws are respectively fixed at
10%, 20% and 15%; and finally, government spending to GDP ratio (g¯s) is set at 14%. To
achieve a stable steady state, we conventionally set the aggregate labour supply ls = 0.25 and
aggregate price Ps = 1 respectively. It is paramount to note that, the steady state relative
prices are determined by mark-ups, technological parameters and various tax rates. The steady
state relative price of the shadow sector goods is higher than the official sector relative price
due to the high cost of factor inputs. The rest of steady state values are calibrated using the
other structural parameters.
2.3.2 Analysis and Discussion of Results
This section analyses and discusses the various impulse response functions regarding some
key macroeconomic variables with the baseline calibration to asymmetric shocks in the official
sector. Figures (2.1)-(2.6) represent the various responses following government spending,
labour and capital income tax shocks. We analyse how fiscal shocks are transmitted into
the shadow sector and how the presence of shadow sector affects the economy at large. We
note here that, variables are already expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state
values and the continuous red lines in the figures represent the behaviour of shocks in one-
sector (official sector only) economy as in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) while the continuous
blue line defines the behaviour of variables in the two-sector (both official and shadow sector)
economy. The baseline calibration results in the current set up are in line with the existing new
Keynesian DSGE models with two sectors and we describe them accordingly.
Figures (2.1) and (2.2) show a positive response to government spending shock and as expected
from the one-sector model, labour employment, capital demand and product wage rise which
induce an increase in official output. Similar results are obtained in official sector of the two-
sector model, with the main qualitative difference being the fall in official sector product wage.
The government expenditure shock comes in with two effects; a positive demand effects for
official sector firms leading to a rise in labour employment and a negative wealth effects for
official consumers which decreases private consumption and investment in both models. With
the rise in labour demand and supply, labour employment increases and wage rate falls as a
result of a fall in relative goods prices in the two-sector model. The reduction in the relative
price of official goods lead to the reallocation of factor demand towards official goods and the
reduction in official wage in the two-sector model brings about an inflow of employment toward
the formal sector making labour reallocation an integral part of the model. The reallocation of
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labour employment towards the formal sector causes the shadow sector employment as a share
of total employment to fall. This is also attributed to the rise in capital stock in the formal
sector which further increases the productivity relative to the shadow sector making agents to
reallocate to the formal sector. On the response of labour employment and real wages, see
Pappa et al. (2015) for similar analysis on four Euro zone economies. The persistent rise in
nominal interest rate, though relative sectoral prices are falling, contributes to the fall in private
consumption in both models and the increasing official sector inflation leads to sharp rise in the
official sector output. The fall in official sector private consumption in both models is mainly
caused by the negative wealth effects which arises from the increase in consumers anticipation
of a higher taxes in the future due to government spending hikes. The large positive effects
of government spending shock on official output is mainly determined by the substantial rise
in labour employment and capital flows in the official sector. The results from this calibration
is consistent with Hayat and Qadeer (2016) for Asian countries; and Khan and Khan (2011)
for Pakistani economy. On the other hand, the government spending shocks decreases the
shadow sector output, consumption, labour employment and capital demand which indicate
a dampened effect of the shock on the shadow sector. These results are expected since most
of the government spendings are geared toward the official sector. The strong role played by
the shadow sector impact on the aggregate variables. The government spending multiplier is
substantial in the model in both periods considered and the result replicate that of Forni et al.
(2009), which obtained smaller multipliers and a subsequent fall in private consumption. To
deepen the consistency of the qualitative results, our government spending multipliers provide
us with further reason to believe in the transmissions at work. As table (2.3) shows, there is a
positive effect of government spending shock in the one-sector model. However, the two-sector
model multipliers indicated a positive spending shock effect in the official sector and a negative
spending effect in the shadow sector. This again strengthens the reallocation effects toward the
formal sector in the presence of shadow economy.
Figures (2.3) and (2.4) present the impulse responses of labour income tax hikes on the economy.
We immediately observe that the shock has a contractionary effect in the one-sector model
and the official sector of the two-sector model thereby reducing output, private consumption,
investment, labour employment and capital demand. The one-sector model shows that higher
taxes raises the product wage, marginal cost and subsequently the inflation. The fall in
aggregate demand makes firms to reduce their labour demand leading to a fall in labour
employment and output in the official sector. The two-sector model also indicates a negative
transmissions of the shock in the official sector. However, the presence of shadow economy has a
powerful amplifying effects on the shadow sector output, consumption, investment and labour
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employment. The presence of shadow economy has a reallocation effects of factors services
toward the shadow sector which is caused by the relative consumption and factor input prices
(wages) thus resulting in increasing demand for shadow goods and services. We note here that,
aggregate variables such as output, labour employment and consumption all rise in accordance
to the shadow sector variables which indicate the powerful role played by the shadow sector.
We now focus on capital income tax shocks which on the impact results in negative transmission
of the shock to the official economy as figures in (2.5) and (2.6). Official sector inflation and
nominal interest rate falls inducing a decrease in real interest rate leading to an outflow of
capital from the official sector to the shadow sector. This in turn lowers the official sector
labour employment thereby inducing an increase in the shadow sector capital demand and
labour employment as a result of a fall in shadow wages. This means that factor inputs with
higher taxes in the official sector would outflow to the unofficial sector making the other factor
inputs more scares in the shadow economy and this attract an inflow of the scares inputs as
well. In the case of capital tax shock, the adjustment of capital is sufficient to generate the
equilibrium dynamics. This mechanism explains the reasons for the lower capital tax multipliers
(almost near to zero) even in the presence of the shadow economy. Overall, we could say that,
tax hikes lead to factor inputs reallocation into the shadow sector. Higher taxes in the official
sector provide incentives for firms and individuals to evade taxes in an economy with large
shadow sector. Moreover, the fall in investment and capital stock in the formal sector lowers
the productivity differentials between the two sectors hence agents reallocate to the shadow
sector leading to an increase in shadow sector labour employment and capital demand. An
empirical work by Pappa et al. (2015) provide similar results with VAR and DSGE models for
some Euro zone economies. Both tax multipliers as in table (2.3) shows a negative effect of
the shock in the one-sector model with two-sector model multipliers indicating a negative tax
effect in the official sector and a positive effect in the shadow sector strengthening the factor
reallocations toward the informal sector.
2.3.3 Fiscal Multipliers
We now discuss the quantitative assessment of the key factors that determine the GDP effects
associated with alternative fiscal instruments with the computed fiscal multipliers. Our aim
at this point is to highlight what happens to the multipliers when we incorporate shadow
economy relative to the benchmark case of one-sector economy. We further use these estimates
to understand whether fiscal policies can be used to stabilise the economy in response to shocks.
According to Pappa et al. (2015) and Basile et al. (2016), estimates of fiscal policy multipliers
in countries with large unreported production sector cannot be relied upon unless the dynamics
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of the hidden and regular components of the GDP are taken into consideration. Table (2.3)
summarizes the computed multipliers of the three fiscal instruments on output in both the short-
run and long-run periods. Following Faia et al. (2013) and Coenen et al. (2013), the short-
run multipliers (impact multipliers) are calculated as output effects during the impact period
divided by the cost during the impact period.17 Long-run multipliers (cumulative multipliers)
are computed as the discounted output effects divided by the discounted costs over the periods
considered.18 Computing the size and the sign of the fiscal multipliers are essential for designing
Table 2.3: Fiscal multipliers for various fiscal packages based on impulse response.
Gov. spending Labour tax Capital tax
Without shadow economy
(One-sector model)
Output
Short run 0.525 -0.123 -0.002
Long run 0.254 -0.221 -0.008
With shadow economy
(Two-sector model)
Official output
Short run 0.158 -0.193 -0.001
Long run 0.205 -0.300 -0.003
Shadow output
Short run -0.364 0.607 0.003
Long run -1.120 1.560 0.014
and the implementation of fiscal policies. In case a government spending multiplier is smaller
than expected, then expansionary fiscal policy would fail to sufficiently boost the economic
activity of a country and it would also increase the public indebtedness as a percentage of
GDP. The second important component of fiscal policy is that a tax multiplier that have a
larger than expected value may depress the economy more than anticipated and it will destroy
the tributary base from which all the taxes are collected (Hayat and Qadeer, 2016). Key
findings from our computations are that both short-run and long-run labour income tax and
government multipliers are quite sizeable, although generally smaller than one while capital tax
multipliers are near to zero.19 The government spending multipliers show a positive effect in
17For government spending, we compute the short-run multiplier as:
MgSR =
yt − ys
gt − gs
where ys and gs denote steady state variables.
18For government spending, we compute the long-run multiplier as:
MgLR =
∑∞
t=0 β
t(yt − ys)∑∞
t=0 β
t(gt − gs)
19The reason for the smaller size of the multipliers are: firstly, multipliers computed from impulse responses
give smaller multipliers relative to those computed based on the standardised fiscal stimulus. Secondly,
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the one-sector model as expected while the two-sector model government spending multipliers
indicated a positive government spending shock effect in the official sector and a negative
spending effect in the shadow sector. This occurs as a result of the reallocation effects of factor
inputs from the shadow sector toward the formal sector. Moreover, tax multipliers as shown on
table (2.3) indicate a negative effects of the income tax shock in the one-sector model, however,
the presence of the shadow sector offsets the negative multiplier because there is a reallocation
of factor inputs in response to the shocks. This further strengthens the role played by shadow
economy in the transmission processes. In a nut shell, the presence of shadow economy reduces
and weakens the government expenditure multiplier, whiles the income tax multipliers are
strengthened as a result of the private sector’s response to the shocks. The amplifying income
tax effects occur simply because the effects of relative consumption and factor inputs prices
create a spill-over effects onto the shadow sector which determines the sectoral factor allocation
in the model.
2.3.4 Fiscal Stabilizers
In this section we compare both models (with and without shadow economy) with the situation
where fiscal instruments react to some fiscal feedback rule. Specifically, we assume that all
the three fiscal instruments react to their own lagged values and to the official sector output
(yot ) where the latter feedback is thought to reflect the notion of automatic stabilizers. A
more realistic treatment of fiscal policy suggest that the inclusion of fiscal stabilizers might
be important in assessing the stability of the model (see recent contributions by Coenen et al.
(2012, 2013); Albonico et al. 2016). We therefore perform this robustness check by allowing
for fiscal stabilizer on government spendings, labour and capital income taxation. We model
government spending along the lines of Albonico et al. (2016) given as:
lngt = ρ
Glngt−1 + θGy lny
o
t + ξ
G
t (2.44)
Similarly, as an illustration of the fiscal rules on the revenue side, both labour and capital
income tax rules are given respectively as:
lnτWt = ρ
W lnτWt−1 + θ
W
y lny
o
t + ξ
W
t (2.45)
developing countries usually have lower tax bases. Typically, tax collection is very low in low-income countries
around 10%-20% of their GDP. Thirdly, low-income countries mostly have many small-scale firms and large
informal sector. It therefore makes it difficult to impose proper taxes on large informal and small-scaled sector
of the poor economies, such as village shops and street vendors, because there is no formal record of their incomes
and transactions. These countries normally have agrarian economies in which farmer’s incomes are seasonal and
unstable, so it is difficult to calculate base for an income tax. Fourthly, governments of developing countries have
alternative sources of revenues such as foreign aid, which are sometimes larger than domestically generated tax
revenues and a significant fraction of GDP. And lastly, incomes are unevenly distributed in developing countries
and there are institutional lapses such as a lack of efficient, well trained and well-educated tax administrators.
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lnτKt = ρ
K lnτKt−1 + θ
K
y lny
o
t + ξ
K
t (2.46)
where parameters θGy , θWy and θKy are the stabilization parameters which measure the
responsiveness of the fiscal rules to official sector output. The feedback rule parameters are such
that θGy is strictly negative and θWy and θKy are strictly positive according to prior estimates
from the literature. An empirical estimation from the literature on feedback coefficients in both
expenditure and revenue rules are generally not well specified by the data, we therefore follow
Coenen et al. (2012, 2013) and Corsetti et al. (2012), to set θGy = −0.06, θWy = θKy = 0.21 which
were rationalized based on empirical estimations.20 These rules allow government spending and
other fiscal instruments to depend on the level of official sector output and it postulate that
whenever official output is below its long-run level, fiscal spending increases and income tax
rates fall. The main reason for this check is to examine whether the role played fiscal stabilizers
in stabilizing the model is impaired or enhanced following the introduction of shadow economy
into the model. We do so by imposing a stabilization policy and compare with the model
without fiscal stabilizers in both one-sector and two-sector models. We then compute a fiscal
gap variable for the two cases in each model.21 Figures (2.7)-(2.9) show the various fiscal gap
variables for output under the three fiscal instruments considered. The blue bars represent the
fiscal gap variable in the model without shadow economy and the orange bars represent the
fiscal gap variable in the model with shadow economy.
The results from figure (2.7) shows that fiscal feedback stabilizes the positive government
spending shock effects by reducing the output and this result is further strengthened in the
model with shadow economy. This is why the fiscal gap variable in this case is negative
during the periods considered. It strengthens the argument that fiscal stabilizers moderate
overheating economies in periods of booms without affecting the underlying soundness of
budgetary positions as long as fluctuations remain balanced. On the other hand, during
recessions like our case with income tax hikes, fiscal stabilizers are to support economic
activities. As shown on figures (2.8) and (2.9), our fiscal feedbacks on taxes stabilize the
economy by raising output in both models. The stabilization policy are strengthened with the
introduction of shadow economy. This indicated that fiscal feedbacks on government spending
(income taxes) stabilized the economy by reducing (raising) output levels and these results
even become stronger with the presence of shadow economy. These robustness checks further
strengthens the role and the importance of introducing shadow sector into the model.
20To the best of our knowledge, none of the literature on developing and emerging countries have estimates
for these feedback rule parameters. We therefore use those values as a proxy for our experiment.
21Fiscal gap variable is defined as the difference between the variable value (output) in the case with fiscal
stabilizers and the variable value in the case without fiscal stabilizers.
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2.4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of fiscal policies in a new Keynesian DSGE model in the
presence of shadow economies. We do so by examining the various channels and factors which
influence the dynamic properties of the model. So far, most theoretical and empirical DSGE
models have mainly focused on monetary policy analysis and the few ones which focus on fiscal
policy rules do so without the consideration of shadow economies. We add to the literature by
extending the DSGE model by Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and explicitly model fiscal
policies to interact with monetary policy in the presence of shadow economy to allow for
appropriate specifications and analysis. Our simulation involves exogenous processes that are
asymmetric to the official sector consisting of government spending shock, labour and capital
income tax shocks.
Our results message is that, shadow economies play a significant role in determining the
behaviour of the real business cycle specifically the behaviour of the aggregate variables. Our
results show that in economies with large share of informal sector, tax hikes lead to a sizeable
tax evasion and a boost in the shadow economy making the standard aggregate estimates of
fiscal policies ineffective while government spending shocks slow down the activities in the
shadow sector. Moreover, there is negative transmission of income tax shock to the official
economy as a result of the role played by interest rate and sectoral relative prices. Our results
showed quantitatively that, the presence of shadow economy dampens the official sector’s
response to income tax shocks leading to the reallocation of factor inputs across sectors.
We also found that changes in public spending generate a reduction in economic activities
in the shadow sector thereby increasing official sector GDP more proportionately, shrinking
the shadow sector component of the economy. This crowding-out effect of the output and
inputs reallocation respectively contribute to obscure the effectiveness of government spending
and income tax on the total GDP. Our results are consistent with VAR evidence obtained for
Italian economy, government spendings reduce the size of the informal economy, while formal
sector tax hikes increase the size of informal sector. It also turns out that the incorporation
of shadow sector significantly reduces the government spending multipliers whereas the labour
income tax multipliers are increased. The amplifying income tax effects occur simply because
the effects of relative consumption and factor inputs prices create a spill-over effects onto the
shadow sector which determines the sectoral factor allocation in the model. Our results from
the fiscal feedbacks on government spending (income taxes) stabilized the economy by reducing
(raising) output levels and these results even become stronger with the presence of shadow
economy.
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Figure 2.1: Response to Government Spending Shock
Figure 2.2: Response to Government Spending Shock (cont’d)
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Figure 2.3: Response to Labour Income Tax Shock
Figure 2.4: Response to Labour Income Tax Shock (cont’d)
51
Figure 2.5: Response to Capital Income Tax Shock
Figure 2.6: Response to Capital Income Tax Shock (cont’d)
Figure 2.7: Fiscal stabilizer gap - gov. spending shock
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Figure 2.8: Fiscal stabilizer gap - capital income tax shock
Figure 2.9: Fiscal stabilizer gap - labour income tax shock
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CHAPTER 3
Fiscal Policy shocks in Developing Countries: A DSGE
model with Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and Shadow
Economy.
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal policies over the years have become an important macroeconomic tool for countries of
all income levels following the inability of monetary policies to avoid the financial crisis that
hit the world economies in 2007. In wake of this, new views on the role played by fiscal policies
and its expansion were particularly large in the US and the UK (Krugman, 2012). European
countries such as Germany, Greece, Portugal, Spain and others; on the other hand, put forward
consolidated plans that include cuts in public employment, public wages and public investments
as well as increases in VAT and labour income tax rates. The increase in taxes and cutting
of public spending have been the main fiscal tools used by fiscal authorities to bring fiscal
imbalances back on track over the years. Most developing and emerging countries over years
have followed similar fiscal policy regimes to create an equitable distribution of income and
wealth in the society. Though developing and emerging countries’ economic structures are
different from industrialized countries in many respects; for instance, in developing countries
public transfers are typically small, and the biggest share of government spending over the years
have been represented by consumption of goods and services, and by government wages; on the
revenue side, and consumption taxes often are the biggest component. In the face of this, most
developing and emerging countries still use fiscal expansions and recovery plans as a way of
achieving economic growth and development.
Recent development in dynamic stochastic general equlibrium models has gained momentum
due to its reliability to evaluate alternative macroeconomic policy measures. The applications of
DSGE models have included the assessment of temporary versus permanent fiscal instruments,
the assessment of structural changes in government taxes and spending policy, the analysis of
fiscal packages, the analysis of fiscal multipliers and the role of private demand as well as the
interactions of fiscal and monetary policies. Such DSGE literature include, Gali and Monacelli
(2008); Coenen et al. (2008); Colciago et al. (2008); and Erceg and Lindè (2010). In the
context of fiscal policy, models by Coenen and Straub (2005) and Gali et al. (2007) focus
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primarily on the implications of government spending, and deficit is adjusted using lump-sum
taxes. Coenen et al. (2013) focus on the implications of European Economic Recovery Plan
(EERP), whereas Cogan et al. (2010); Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) focused on the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertsson (2011)
study the effects of fiscal stimulus at the zero-lower bound interest rate. Most of these DSGE
models were built upon the real business cycle models that had always produced negative
wealth effects on households which in turn reduce private consumption, increase labour supply
and decrease real wages (Baxter and King, 1993), new Keynesian DSGE models with real
frictions and nominal rigidities also display the same wealth effects mechanism (Goodfriend
and King, 1997; Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). Other standard version of the new Keynesian
DSGE models also typically predict a positive or at least no significant negative response of
private consumption to government spending shocks (Perotti, 2002; Fatàs and Mihov, 2001;
Canzoneri et al. 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009). The literature has identified this sharp
contrast between the implications of the theory on one hand, and empirical results on the
other, as a puzzle. Following this gap and uncertainty in results shown by previous literature,
Mankiw (2000) argue that a fiscal policy model where both Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents
coexist provide a better fiscal policy analysis relative to neoclassical and overlapping generation
models.1 The notion that fraction of consumers consume all their current disposable incomes
each period, while the remaining fraction optimise intertemporally, was first developed by Hall
(1978) as an alternative to the permanent income hypothesis. Campbell and Mankiw (1989,
1991) rejected the permanent income hypothesis against this alternative, and later, Mankiw
(2000) suggested that rule-of-thumb consumers should be included in models that are built for
fiscal policy analysis. In particular, Gali et al. (2007) show that private consumption may
rise after a positive shock to government spending if the so-called rule-of-thumb consumers are
allowed to co-exist with Ricardian consumers. In the model, Ricardian consumers decrease their
consumption following a government spending shock because they correctly anticipate a decline
in income through taxation. But rule-of-thumb consumers increase their consumption when
current disposable income increases. This happens in the model when the government finances
its budget at least partially through the issuance of bonds, under assumptions of sticky prices
and an imperfectly competitive labour market. They concluded that, for empirically plausible
calibrations of the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers, the degree of price stickiness, and the
1Ricardian or intertemporal optimizing consumers are the distinction between fraction of households who
own assets and are able to smooth consumption over time while the remaining fraction of households (non-
Ricardian) do not participate in the financial market and thereby entirely consume their current disposable
income. The term non-Ricardian consumers are used interchangeably with hand-to-mouth consumers, rule-of-
thumb consumers or Limited Asset Market Participation (LAMP). The reasons provided to justify the presence
of non-Ricardian consumers are miopia, fear of saving, financial insecurities and transaction costs on financial
markets.
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extent of deficit financing determine whether an increase in government spending raises or lowers
consumption. Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2009), established that the share
of non-Ricardian households is an important element to affect a positive reaction of private
consumption to public expenditure shocks. Coenen (2012, 2013), focused on the role played
by fiscal policies during the 2008-2009 recession periods with a smaller share of non-Ricardian
households and found that Coenen (2005) results are mainly determined by complementarity
between private and public consumptions in household’s preferences. Anderson et al. (2016) use
US data to estimate individual-level impulse responses as well as multipliers for government
spending and tax policy shocks. Their findings were that the wealthiest individuals behave
according to the predictions of standard DSGE models, but the poorest individuals tend to
neglect interest rate changes and adopt consumption patterns that closely follow their current
disposable income dynamics. They therefore suggested that DSGE models should incorporate
the LAMP consumers where a fraction of non-Ricardian households do not hold any wealth
and consume their disposable labour income in each period. Rossi (2007), showed that the
introduction of non-Ricardian consumers can reverse the traditional predictions of a change in
government spending on the economy as a whole: under a reasonable parametrization of the
model, an increase in government spending can lead, against the common Keynesian wisdom,
to a decrease in total output. The introduction of a distortive fiscal policy leads to a negative
response of private consumption to a positive government spending shock. According to Motta
and Tirelli (2012), the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007 witnessed growing concerns
for income inequality and for the distributional effects of macroeconomic policies. They argued
that, redistributive actions have been the domain of fiscal policies, but in recent years even
monetary policies have come under scrutiny for their effects on inequality. Their work hammered
on the importance of including rule-of-thumb consumers in fiscal policy analysis to interact with
monetary policy. Albonico et al. (2014, 2016) introduce LAMP to a standard new Keynesian
model which allowed to incorporate the possibility that public consumption shocks simulate
private consumption and that transfer shocks provide a demand stimulus as in Oh and Reis
(2012). They showed that the presence of both sticky prices and LAMP are necessary elements
to have a positive response of private consumption to government spending shocks. Sticky
prices make it possible for real wages to increase as the price mark-ups may adjust sufficiently
downward to absorb the resulting gap. LAMP in part insulate aggregate demand from the
negative wealth effects as a result of the higher taxes needed to finance the fiscal expansion.
Albonico et al. (2014) results further showed that LAMP is sizeable in the Euro area (39%
of households over the 1993-2012 sample) and LAMP were important to understand European
Monetary Union business cycle, especially, in light of the recent financial crisis. Bhattarai and
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Trzeciakiewicz (2017) show that independently whether public consumption is introduced into
the utility of households or not, in a closed or open-economy setup, public consumption and
public investment are the most effective fiscal instruments in the short-run, whereas capital
income tax and the public investment are such instruments in the longer horizon. The results
from their model revealed a negative response of private consumption to government spending
shocks and public transfers yield relatively lower multipliers when compared with the remaining
fiscal policy instruments they considered.
Most of these standard DSGE models that examine the role of fiscal policy and LAMP
have mainly focused on the features of advanced countries and hence lacked the prerequisite
ingredients for modelling developing and emerging economies. It therefore becomes irrational
to replicate such models with advanced countries’ features to the developing and Low-Income
Countries (LIC). The reason being that, empirical literature on most of these developing and
LIC countries suggest that developing countries are characterised by weak financial sector,
large proportions of liquidity constrained consumers, existence of large informal sectors, external
shock vulnerability and weak economic and political institutions. In light of this, our major aim
and contribution to the existing literature on DSGE models with fiscal policy is the introduction
of shadow sector and their interaction with rule-of-thumb consumers. We further seek to know
whether the incorporation of shadow economy weakens the amplifying effect of rule-of-thumb
consumers on fiscal multipliers. The consideration of rule-of-thumb consumers is very significant
in our model because they constitute the larger share of the consumption population in most of
the developing and LIC countries. For instance, based on data collected in 2011, Demirguc-Kunt
and Klapper (2012) reported that on average only 24% of adults in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA)
countries have an account in the formal financial institutions. Melina et al. (2016) also argue
that depending on the degree of financial development of a particular developing country, the
measure of intertemporal optimizing households can be lower than 40% in SSA countries. Given
this background, the paper seeks to investigate the role of fiscal policy over the real business
cycle in the presence of shadow economy with a larger share of the rule-of-thumb consumers.
We specifically follow Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and introduce these two features to
ascertain their role in transmitting fiscal policies into the real sector. Our model is characterised
by a competitive labour market where firms in the two sectors pay the same consumption real
wage. This assumption is motivated by the theoretical contributions from Amaral and Quintin
(2006); Pratap and Quintin (2006) and supported by Maloney (1999, 2004). The contributions
by Pratap and Quintin (2006) on developing countries provided evidence against labour market
segmentation and suggested that labour market arguments are not necessary to account for the
silent features of labour market in developing countries. A major disparity that exist between
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the sectors (formal and informal sectors) are the calibrations of technology and price mark-up
parameters. We choose a smaller capital share to capture a low capital intensity in the shadow
sector and we also set the price elasticity of demand parameter to also capture low levels of price
mark-ups in the shadow sector. A major policy implication is whether the fiscal authorities
should target the participation rate with fiscal policy in the presence of shadow economy with
liquidity constrained individuals. We do so by formulating a fiscal macroeconomic DSGE model
with large share of shadow economy and LAMP consumers. We compute our fiscal variables
(an average effective tax rates on labour, capital income and consumption) following Melina
et al. (2016) which are consistent with data collected by the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation in 2005-2006. Our model features a number of real and nominal frictions that
capture the empirical persistence in the literature. It again deviates a little from the Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007) by modelling goods producer’s prices ala Rotemberg (1982) with full
inflation indexation. We further provide computations of output multipliers for the alternative
fiscal instruments from both models to highlight the happenings of the model multipliers with
the incorporation of shadow economy and LAMP consumers. This would help us answer the
question of whether shadow economy weakens the amplifying effect of rule-of-thumb consumers
on fiscal policy measures.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows, section 2 provides an overview of the model with
non-Ricardian characteristics, section 3 reports on the parameters and steady state ratios used
for calibrating the model. It also presents the results and some sensitivity analysis. Finally,
section 4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
There is a continuum of households of measure unity who consume a bundle of two goods and
supply labour services at the same wage rate to each sector of the economy (i ∈ [o, u]). Each
household group is made up of a share 1 − θ of households (Ricardian households, j = r)
who can access financial markets, trade in government bonds, accumulate physical capital and
rent capital services to firms in each sector. The remaining fraction θ of households (non-
Ricardian or LAMP households, j = rt) do not have access to financial markets and consume
all their disposable labour income and transfers from the government. Each individual in
the household supplies the bundle of labour services that firms demand in each sector of the
economy at a given unique wage rate in consumption units. Following earlier contributions by
Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), we assume that household members perfectly share the
risk of sectoral consumption so individual’s consumption decisions are independent from their
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working conditions across sectors. Ricardian households wealth is accumulated by purchasing
government bonds and investment in firms; they also decide on how much capital to accumulate
based on the capital adjustment cost and capital utilisation. The intermediate goods producers
supply their intermediate goods to final goods producers who differentiate and repackage them
into final goods for households. Final goods producers in both sectors are able to reset their
prices ala Rotemberg model. Finally, we capture the financial sector’s impact through capital
and investment frictions and we close the model by assuming a central bank who follows strictly
inflation targeting policy.
Households consumption basket cjt is described as a CES aggregate over the two sectors
consumption bundle with j ∈ [r, rt]:
cjt =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o,j
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cu,jt )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (3.1)
Furthermore, each cjt is also defined as:
ci,jt =
(∫ 1
0
c
i,j
(
i−1
i
)
t dz
i,j
) i
i−1
where ϕc indicates official sector consumption goods bias and c > 1 is the measure of elasticity
of substitution between official consumption (co,jt ) and unofficial consumption (c
u,j
t ) bundles
whereas i > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods that form
cjt . Minimizing total consumption expenditures subject to the consumption bundle given above
yields the following demand function for each good:2
co,jt = ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
Pt
)−c
cjt (3.2)
cu,jt = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
cjt (3.3)
where τ c is a consumption tax levied by the government on official sector consumption goods
to finance its expenditure. The aggregate consumption price index is given as:
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (3.4)
In a symmetric way, we assume wages obtained by households from supplying labour services
in both sectors to be flexible, thus labour market equilibrium requires that the marginal rate
of substitution between total labour supplied to each sector equals the wage.3
2In the official sector, consumption tax drives a wedge between final goods price set by firms and the
corresponding consumption price.
3The labour market equilibrium requires that wi,jt = mrs
i,j
t , where mrs
j
t = −U i,jl,t /U i,jc,t is the marginal rate
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3.2.1 Ricardian households
Ricardian households are made up of individuals who consume, work in both sectors of the
economy and return the wages they earn to the household. Their savings and investments
are made through purchasing of government bonds and supplying of capital to sectoral goods
producers. For each sector, Ricardian household members, own goods producers, hold physical
capital and choose their investment to both sectors. Ricardian households can increase the
supply of rental services from capital by investing in additional capital taking into account the
adjustment cost of capital. The lifetime utility of Ricardian households is characterised by:
Urt = Et
∞∑
n=0
βn
{
ln(crt+n)− χ
l
i,r(1+φ)
t
1 + φ
}
(3.5)
where χ is a parameter that regulates the disutility of work and φ defines the Frisch elasticity
of labour. Their intertemporal budget constraint is:4
crt+
P ot
Pt
io,rt +
Put
Pt
iu,rt +
Brt
PtRtεRISKt
=
P ot
Pt
(1−τwt )wot lo,rt +
Put
Pt
wut l
u,r
t +
P ot
Pt
(1−τkt )rk,ot uot k¯o,rt +
Put
Pt
rk,ut u
u
t k¯
u,r
t +
+
Brt−1
Pt
− P
o
t
Pt
(1− τkt )a(uot )k¯o,rt +
P ot
Pt
τkt δk¯
o,r
t −
Put
Pt
a(uut )k¯
u,r
t +
P ot
Pt
Πot +
Put
Pt
Πut +
P ot
Pt
TRrt −
P ot
Pt
T rt
(3.6)
where crt is Ricardian household consumption bundle from both sectors, Brt is government bond
that pays one unit of currency in period t − 1 and Rt is the gross nominal interest rate. We
define a number of sectoral variables: the relative goods prices P it , the capital k
i,r
t (where
the bar indicates physical units of capital), labour services li,rt , the return on capital r
k,i
t , the
utilisation rate of capital uit, Πit being the profit received from investment in goods production
and product wage wit. The term a(uit) defines the real cost of using the capital stock with
intensity uit. The fiscal authority makes net lump-sum taxes T rt which allows to deal with debt
accumulation and finances its expenditures by issuing bonds and by levying taxes on labour
income τwt and capital income τkt . The public transfers TR
r
t ensure that consumption at the
steady state is the same for the two types of households (Gali et al., 2007). εRISKt is the risk
premium shock on the return to bonds that affects the intertemporal margin, creating a wedge
between the interest rate controlled by the central bank and the return on assets held by the
households, which follows an AR(1) stochastic process with an i.i.d error term given as:
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (3.7)
of substitution between consumption and labour supplied in period t + n for the households. This means that
the official and shadow sector would pay the same consumption wage to workers (Gali 2008).
4Here we ignore superscript i.
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Households’ stock of physical capital in each sector is driven by the standard dynamic equation
for capital given respectively as:
k¯o,rt+1 = (1− δ)k¯o,rt + εINVt
[
1− S
(
io,rt
io,rt−1
)]
io,rt (3.8)
k¯u,rt+1 = (1− δ)k¯u,rt +
[
1− S
(
iu,rt
iu,rt−1
)]
iu,rt (3.9)
where S(.) introduces the investment adjustment cost function.5 δ is the depreciation rate and
only capital used in period uitk¯
i,r
t is subject to depreciation. εINVt is the stochastic shock to
the price of investment relative to consumption goods and follows an exogenous process with
an i.i.d. error term as:
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (3.10)
Households in addition choose the utilisation rate of capital with the amount of effective capital
in each sector given as:6
ki,rt = u
i
tk¯
i,r
t−1 (3.11)
Households face the usual maximization problem of maximizing their expected discounted sum
of instantaneous utility (3.5) subject to equations (3.6), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.11). Letting λrt
denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the Ricardian household budget constraint and λrtQit the
Lagrange multiplier for the capital accumulation equations whereby Qit is the Tobin’s q which
is equal to one when there are no capital adjustment costs. It can be interpreted as the one
unit shadow relative price of capital with respect to one-unit of consumption. The first order
conditions with respect to consumption (crt ), government bond (Brt ), sectoral labour (l
i,r
t ),
sectoral capital (k¯i,rt+1), sectoral investment (i
i,r
t ) and capital utilisation (uit) are respectively
given below.7 The intertemporal marginal utility of consumption is:
Urc,t = λ
r
t =
1
crt
(3.12)
The consumption Euler equation from government bond is:
λrt = ε
RISK
t RtβEt
λrt+1
pit+1
(3.13)
5The investment adjustment cost function is given by:
S
(
ii,rt
ii,rt−1
)
=
κI
2
(
ii,rt
ii,rt−1
− 1
)2
In the steady state, S(1) = S′(1) = 0, S′′(1) > 0 ≡ $ with $ being the adjustment cost parameter.
6In the steady state, utilisation cost function implies that: uis = 1 and a(1) = 0.
7A detailed derivations of all the first order conditions are available upon request.
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In competitive labour market, the standard labour supply conditions hold as:
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χl
o,r(φ)
t
λrt
(3.14)
Put
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χl
u,r(φ)
t
λrt
(3.15)
The arbitrage condition in the labour market ensures that both sectors pay the same level of
real wage as:
P ot
Pt
wot (1− τwt ) =
Put
Pt
wut (3.16)
The competitive capital supplied to each sector is accordingly given as:
Qot = βEt
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[
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The first order conditions for investments supplied to each sector is given as:
P ot
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= Qot ε
INV
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And finally, the following equations also gives the first order conditions for effective capital
utilised:
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (3.21)
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (3.22)
solving the first order conditions for crt and Brt defines the consumption Euler equation.
3.2.2 Non-Ricardian households
Rule-of-thumb households have the same lifetime utility function as that of intertemporal
optimizing households given as:
Urtt = Et
∞∑
n=0
βn
{
ln(crtt+n)− χ
l
i,rt(1+φ)
t
1 + φ
}
(3.23)
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LAMP households consume their disposable labour income and transfers in each period,
therefore their consumption is determined by the budget constraint:8
crtt =
P ot
Pt
(1− τwt )wot lo,rtt +
Put
Pt
wut l
u,rt
t +
P ot
Pt
TRrtt (3.24)
where crtt is non-Ricardian households consumption bundle from both sectors and labour services
li,rtt defines sectoral labour supplied. Letting λrtt denote the Lagrangian multiplier for the non-
Ricardian household’s budget constraint, the first order conditions with respect to consumption
(crtt ) and sectoral labour (l
i,rt
t ) are respectively given below. The intertemporal marginal utility
of consumption is:
Urtc,t = λ
rt
t =
1
crtt
(3.25)
In competitive labour market, the standard labour supply conditions hold as:
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χl
o,rt(φ)
t
λrtt
(3.26)
Put
Pt
wut =
χl
u,rt(φ)
t
λrtt
(3.27)
3.2.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
In each sector i ∈ (o, u), goods producers produce intermediate goods and sell them at the
competitive intermediate price P I,it to final goods producers. The production function for a
representative firm is given as:
yit = A
i
tk
i(αi)
t l
i(1−αi)
t (3.28)
where yit, kit and lit respectively denote sectoral output, capital and labour inputs. αi is the
sectoral capital share used in productive activities. Aot is the official sector productivity shock
which is defined as an AR(1) process with i.i.d error term as:
lnAot = ρ
AlnAot−1 + ξ
A
t (3.29)
Goods producers in each sector maximize their market value by choosing labour (lit) and capital
(kit) taking into account their production output level. Their market value (Πit) is expressed as:
Πit =
P I,it
Pt
[
yit − witlit − rk,it kit
]
(3.30)
8Here we ignore superscript i.
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where P I,it , wit and r
k,i
t are respectively sectoral goods price, real wage rate and the real returns
from capital. P
I,i
t
Pt
yit represent the firm’s revenue from selling output, and
P I,it
Pt
(witl
i
t + r
k,i
t k
i
t)
are the repayments made by goods producers to households which consist of the wage bill and
cost of physical capital. The following equations respectively define the first order conditions
for sectoral labour and capital:
wit = (1− αi)Ait
(
kit
lit
)αi
(3.31)
rk,it = α
iAit
(
kit
lit
)−(1−αi)
(3.32)
This implies a capital-labour ratio given as:
rk,it
wit
=
αi
1− αi
lit
kit
(3.33)
Solving equations (3.31) and (3.32) yield sectoral real marginal cost as:
mcI,it =
(
rk,it
αi
)αi(
wit
1− αi
)1−αi
(3.34)
3.2.4 Final Goods Producers
We assume a sticky price specification based on Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment cost in
both sectors of the economy. We index their prices to a combination of both current and past
inflation with a weight equal to θpi. The final goods producers maximize their profit function
by choosing their final goods prices taking into account the quadratic adjustment cost given as:
κp
2
(
piit
piit−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yit
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost in adjusting its
nominal prices that can be measured in terms of the final goods with κp being the price stickiness
parameter which accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer-firm relation
and θpi representing the price indexation parameter.
The official sector final goods producers are subject to price mark-up shocks, hence in a
symmetric equilibrium, the Rotemberg version of non-linear New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) is derived as:
(1−mcot )ot = 1− κp
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)
piot
piot−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piot+1
piot
θpi
− 1
)
piot+1
piot
θpi
yot+1
yot
]
(3.35)
64
where ot is now a stochastic parameter which determines the time-varying mark-up in the official
goods markets. As in Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), the official sector final goods producers’
actual mark-up hovers around its desired level over time. This desired level comprises of an
endogenous and exogenous components which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process given as:
lnot = ln
o + lnεpt
lnεpt = ρ
plnεpt−1 + ξ
p
t (3.36)
with ξpt being an i.i.d. normal innovation term. In a symmetric equilibrium, the price adjustment
rule satisfies the following first order condition for the shadow goods producers given as:
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)
piut
piut−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piut+1
piut
θpi
− 1
)
piut+1
piut
θpi
yut+1
yut
]
(3.37)
where mcit =
P I,it
P it
, defines the real marginal cost in terms of the sectoral final goods price.
Here we assume shadow sector goods producers to have limited market power. The above
equations represent the Rotemberg version of non-linear NKPCs that relate sectoral current
inflation to future expected inflation and to the level of relative outputs. The following equations
respectively allow to identify the sectoral price levels and the inflation rate for the consumption
price index:
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (3.38)
Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (3.39)
Pt = pitPt−1 (3.40)
where Pt is defined by equation (3.4).
3.2.5 Government Policies
In this section we introduce and discuss the various government policies in regulating the real
sector. It comprises of the fiscal tools used by the government and a Central Bank who oversees
the implementation of monetary instruments.
Fiscal Policy
The government supplies an exogenous amount of public goods (gt) which is defined in terms
of the official sector goods. Government expenditure is financed through the taxes (levied
on consumption goods, labour and capital income) and the issuance of one period nominally
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risk-free bonds. The government budget constraint is of the form:
gt +
Bt−1
P ot
+ TRt = τ
w
t w
o
t l
o
t + τ
k
t
[
rk,ot u
o
t − a(uot )− δ
]
k¯ot + τ
ccot +
Bt
P ot Rt
+ Tt (3.41)
where TRt are public transfers and Tt are lump-sum taxes which also appear in the household’s
budget constraint and explicitly ensure solvency in government deficit. Government spending
follows a stochastic process with i.i.d. error term given as:9
lngt = ρ
Glngt−1 + ξGt (3.42)
As an illustration of the fiscal rules on the revenue side, we set fiscal rules for the labour and
capital income taxes to follow an AR(1) process given respectively as:
lnτWt = ρ
wlnτWt−1 + ξ
W
t (3.43)
lnτkt = ρ
K lnτKt−1 + ξ
W
t (3.44)
where both ξWt and ξKt represent the respective error term defined as an i.i.d.
Monetary Policy
We close the model by describing a simple structure for the monetary policy rule. The Central
bank is assumed to follow a pure inflation targeting rule and set a standard Taylor-type
monetary policy instrument so that the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to the
movement in inflation gap with interest rate smoothing. The policy rule is characterised by the
following Taylor rule:
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (3.45)
where Rt is the nominal interest rate, ρR is interest rate smoothing parameter, µpi denotes
Taylor coefficient in response to inflation gap10 with εRt denoting monetary policy shock, with a
standard i.i.d innovation. In this context, the monetary policy shock is thought of as unexpected
deviation of the nominal interest rate via Taylor rule at period t. The exogenous shock to
monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as εRt . The central bank supplies the money
demanded by the household to support the desired nominal interest rate.
9In the steady state, we impose that gs
yos
= g¯s in order to obtain the public consumption-output ratio.
10That is, deviation of inflation rate from the inflation target.
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3.2.6 Aggregation
With two types of households, aggregate consumption, labour, investment, capital, privately-
owned government bonds and transfers from the government are computed as follows for the
respective sectors in the economy:
cot = (1− θ)co,rt + θco,rtt (3.46)
cut = (1− θ)cu,rt + θcu,rtt (3.47)
ct = (1− θ)crt + θcrtt (3.48)
lot = (1− θ)lo,rt + θlo,rtt (3.49)
lut = (1− θ)lu,rt + θlu,rtt (3.50)
lrt = l
o,r
t + l
u,r
t (3.51)
lrtt = l
o,rt
t + l
u,rt
t (3.52)
lt = (1− θ)lrt + θlrtt (3.53)
iot = (1− θ)io,rt (3.54)
iut = (1− θ)iu,rt (3.55)
kot = (1− θ)ko,rt (3.56)
kut = (1− θ)ku,rt (3.57)
Bt = (1− θ)Brt (3.58)
Tt = (1− θ)T rt (3.59)
TRt = (1− θ)TRrt + θTRrtt (3.60)
3.2.7 Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraints are given respectively as:11
yot = c
o
t + i
o
t + gt + a(u
o
t )k¯
o
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yot (3.61)
11We note here that, the official sector resource constraint incorporates the government expenditure.
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yut = c
u
t + i
u
t + a(u
u
t )k¯
u
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yut (3.62)
3.3 Model Dynamics and Results
In this section, we calibrate the theoretical model by imposing several fiscal impulses. The
aim, as explained in the introductory section, is to investigate the role played by rule-of-thumb
consumers in a new Keynesian DSGE model with shadow economy during fiscal transmissions.
We do so by examining the various channels of fiscal shocks on the dynamic properties of the
model. Model calibrations involve the fiscal exogenous processes asymmetric to the official
sector consisting of government spending shock, labour and capital income tax shocks. We
accordingly solve the model by focusing on the constraints and first order conditions for prices
and quantities, we then derive all the log-linearised equations of the model by taking log-linear
approximations around the steady state.12 The next subsection presents the results and analysis
of the impulse responses to the three exogenous shocks.
3.3.1 Model Calibrations
Most of the conventional structural parameters are borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2007)
and Colombo et al. (2016). These parameters are selected in order to capture specific ratios in
the steady state of the model. Other structural parameters whose information are particularly
related to the developing countries are calibrated using values and data from literature on
developing and low-income countries which is the focus of this research. The complete list of
parameters and their values are in table (3.1).
Conventional household’s preference and technological parameters are fairly standard. We set
the subjective discount factor β to 0.99 which is consistent to achieve an annual steady state
interest rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between official and informal consumption
bundles is set at c = 1.5 as described in Batini et al. (2011). The coefficient of Frisch
elasticity of substitution for labour supply in the utility function is fixed at φ = 2 to ensure
determinacy of the equilibrium. Turning to the goods producer’s structural parameters, from
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we take the price elasticity of demand for differentiated goods
parameter o = 6, a value consistent with a 20% price mark up in the official sector. Its
shadow sector counterpart value is set at u = 20 to imply a 5% price mark up. The degree
of inflation indexation parameter is set to θpi = 1 to indicates a full indexation of inflation.
The degree of price stickiness parameter is fixed at κp = 4.37. Available literature suggests
no evidence of nominal rigidities in the shadow sector, therefore the benchmark values for
12The appendix shows the full set of the first order conditions and the log-linearised equations.
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inflation indexation and degree of price stickiness are used for both sectors as in Colombo
et al. (2016). The depreciation rate is set to equal δ = 0.025 quarterly which implies an
annual depreciation on capital of 10%. We additionally set the official sector capital share to
αo = 0.36 to capture a high capital intensity in the official sector than the informal sector
share which is valued at αu = 0.28 as in Koreshkova (2006). In order to characterise the
Table 3.1: Model calibration parameters.
Parameter Value Description
Preferences & Technology
β 0.99 Subjective discount rate
φ 2 Frisch elasticity of substitution for labour
c 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between official
and unofficial consumption
θ 0.60 Share of non-Ricardian households
o 6 Official sector price elasticity of demand
u 20 Shadow sector price elasticity of demand
κp 4.37 Degree of price stickiness
θpi 1 Inflation indexation
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation
αo 0.36 Official sector’s capital Share
αu 0.28 Shadow sector’s capital Share
Monetary policy
ρR 0.9 Interest rate smoothing parameter
µpi 1.5 Taylor coefficient to inflation gap
Fiscal ratio
τ c 0.10 Consumption tax
τks 0.20 Capital income tax
τws 0.15 Labour income tax
g¯s 0.14 Government consumption
Shock innovation
ρG 0.7 Innovation to government spending shock
ρW 0.8 Innovation to labour income tax shock
ρK 0.75 Innovation to capital income tax shock
empirical findings of the shadow sector in the developing countries, we set the steady state
share of the shadow economy SH = 0.47 (a value common to several developing and low-
income countries) to calibrate the value of official consumption goods bias ϕc. Another crucial
parameter which influence the response of the shocks is the share of non-Ricardian consumers
in the model. Most empirical estimates on developing and low-income countries report that
large proportions of households in these areas are liquidity constrained. For instance, Ardic et
al. (2013) reported that only 25% of the poor population in developing countries has a bank
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account with the financial institutions and 23% of people living under $2 a day have account
in formal financial institutions. Therefore, depending on the degree of financial development of
these countries, the measure of intertemporal optimizing households can be lower than 40% in
most Sub Sahara African (SSA) countries. Based on Global Findex Database, Demirguc-Kunt
and Klapper (2012), reported that the percentage of adults with formal bank account in SSA is
45% in the rich quantile countries and only 12% in the poorest quantile. Upon this background
we set the size of non-Ricardian households θ = 0.60 as used by Melina et al. (2016). The ratios
of fiscal variables to GDP and the steady state tax rates were taken from Melina et al. (2016)
which are consistent with data collected by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
in 2005-06 for developing and low-income countries. The steady state values for τ c, τks , and τws
are respectively fixed at 10%, 20% and 15%; and finally, government spending to GDP ratio
(g¯s) is set at 14%. The steady state distribution of transfers is set to obtain a steady state
consumption ratio between the two household groups as ci,RTt = 0.8c
i,R
t . To achieve a stable
steady state, we conventionally set the aggregate labour supply ljs = 0.25 and aggregate price
Ps = 1 respectively. It is paramount to note that, the steady state relative prices are determined
by mark-ups, technological parameters and various tax rates. The steady state relative price
of the shadow sector goods is higher than the official sector relative price due to the high
cost of factor inputs. The rest of steady state values are calibrated using the other structural
parameters. The conventional parameters characterizing the monetary policy instrument are
set accordingly as: the Taylor rule interest smoothing rate parameter ρR = 0.9 and inflation gap
parameter µpi = 1.5. The parameters describing the shock processes are calibrated as follows,
innovation to government spending shock parameters is set at ρG = 0.7. Innovations to labour
and capital income tax shocks are set at ρW = 0.8 and ρK = 0.75 respectively.
3.3.2 Analysis and Discussion of Results
This section discusses the impulse response functions to various fiscal policy instruments
(government spending, labour and capital income taxes) with rule-of-thumb consumers and
the shadow economy. The shocks are asymmetric to the official sector and the continuous blue
line in figures (3.1)-(3.6) represent the behaviour of the macroeconomic variables in two-sector
model while the broken red line defines the behaviour of the shock in the one-sector model. The
responses of the fiscal shocks to macroeconomic variables are shown in a percentage deviation
from the steady states.
Figures (3.1)-(3.2) present the IRFs from an increase in government spending shock. The
expenditure increase has an expansionary effect in the official sector of both models. The
shock predicted an increase in government demand for goods and services leading to a higher
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capital utilisation and increase in demand for labour employment in the official sector which put
pressure on official rental rate of capital. This in effect, leads to an increase in the official sector
marginal cost which translate into higher inflation which means that monetary authorities
increase the nominal interest rate. Moreover, the surge in government spending means that
government would increase taxes in the future to finance its budget and the Ricardian consumers
anticipate this increase in taxes by reducing their current consumption levels. This leads to
the so called negative wealth effects associated to government spending shocks as documented
in several fiscal policy literatures. Our model is also able to account for the crowding-out of
private investment as in the literature.13 The reason for the fall in Ricardian consumption may
be associated to the fact that our model does not necessarily consider government debt and
labour market imperfections as demonstrated by Gali et al. (2007). The negative wealth effects
do not affect non-Ricardian consumers and therefore their consumption levels rise. The boom
and the subsequent rise in relative consumption and factor input prices in the official sector lead
to the flow of factor inputs from the shadow sector into the official sector, triggering a fall in the
shadow sector capital utilisation and labour employment demanded as well as shadow sector’s
private consumption and aggregate demand. One striking qualitative difference is the fall in
the official sector product wage which could be attributed to the influx of labour employment
from the shadow sector to the formal sector. The steady state arbitrage condition for wage
rate ensures factor services move freely in the economy. In fact, the mechanism indicates that
the presence of shadow economies weakens the effectiveness of government expenditure shock
as most of the shadow activities are slowed down due to reallocating effects of the shock. Our
computed government spending multiplier reiterate this negative effect of the shadow sector as
shown in table (3.2).
Figures (3.3)-(3.4) show the responses for labour income tax hikes to the official sector which
on the impact shows a contractionary effects in the one-sector and the official sector of the two-
sector model. The shock decreases official sector inflation, thus reducing nominal interest rate
and the real interest rate. This in turn, leads to a positive response of official sector investment
in both models. Moreover, the fall in relative goods and factor prices in the shadow sector
lead to a factor input reallocation between the two sectors, raising shadow labour employment,
capital utilisation and capital demand. Additionally, as shadow sector labour employment and
capital demand increase, the fall in shadow consumption goods price makes shadow consumption
and aggregate demand to increase. Therefore, in the presence of shadow economy, the negative
transmission effects from asymmetric labour income tax shocks in the official sector are absorbed
13Gabriel et al. (2010), showed a similar mechanism in a model with two-sector and rule-of-thumb consumers
for the Indian economy. Coenen and Straub (2005); Gali et al. (2007); Rossi (2007) and Colciago (2011) also
reported similar results though none of these literatures considered the shadow economy.
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by the shadow economy. This mechanism strengthens the relative importance of the existence
of shadow sector in wake of income tax shocks. Given the size of our non-Ricardian consumers
in the model, it become paramount to note their relative importance to the transmission process
of the model. The presence of non-Ricardian consumers cannot be underestimated, they make
the labour tax multiplier on consumption to be negative in both models which in effect means
that non-Ricardian consumers weaken the labour tax multiplier. Turning to the capital income
tax shock, figures (3.5)-(3.6) show that, an increase in capital income tax shock like the labour
income tax, produces a contractionary effects in the official sector of both models. Thus, official
sector output, investment, labour employment and capital demand fall. The income tax on
the impact, reduces official sector capital demand inducing a fall in official labour employment.
Changes in factor prices in the shadow sector make both shadow labour employment and capital
demand rises due to factor reallocation effects. On the demand side, the changes in relative
goods and increase in labour employment induces higher consumption for Ricardian consumers.
This in turn, triggers a positive response of shadow sector consumption, investment, aggregate
demand and output.
3.3.3 Fiscal Multipliers
The computed fiscal multipliers provide the quantitative assessment of key factors that
determine the GDP effects associated with the use of alternative fiscal instruments. We do so
to further understand whether fiscal policies can be used to stabilise the economy in response
to shocks and also to ascertain whether the presence of shadow economy weaken the amplifying
effect of rule-of-thumb consumers on fiscal multipliers. Table (3.2) summarizes the computed
multipliers of the three fiscal instruments on output in both the short-run and long-run periods.
The short-run multipliers (impact multipliers) are calculated as output effects during the
impact period divided by the cost during the impact period. Long-run multipliers (cumulative
multipliers) are computed as the discounted output effects divided by the discounted costs over
the periods considered.14
The computed government spending multipliers from both models show a positive effect in the
official sector as expected. However, the presence of the shadow economy resulted in a negative
government spending effect in the shadow sector. In effects, we observe that shadow economy
significantly reduces the government spending multiplier. Moreover, income tax multipliers
14For government spending, we compute the short-run multiplier as:
MgSR =
yt − ys
gt − gs
and the long-run multiplier as:
MgLR =
∑∞
t=0 β
t(yt − ys)∑∞
t=0 β
t(gt − gs)
where ys and gs denote steady state variables.
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as shown by table (3.2) indicate a negative effects in the one-sector model, however, in the
two sector model the presence of the shadow sector offsets the negative effects because there
is a reallocation of factor inputs in response to the shocks. This postulates that shadow
economy increases the tax multipliers specifically labour income tax multiplier with a significant
amount. Another interesting result from our computed multipliers is that the amplifying effects
Table 3.2: Fiscal multipliers for various fiscal packages based on impulse response.
Gov. spending Labour tax Capital tax
Without shadow economy
(One-sector model)
Output
Short run 0.431 -0.109 -0.0011
Long run 0.142 -0.085 -0.0035
Ricardian cons.
Short run -0.292 0.025 0.0023
Long run -0.196 0.016 0.0071
Non-Ricardian cons.
Short run 0.450 -0.206 -0.0007
Long run 0.127 -0.180 -0.0025
With shadow economy
(Two-sector model)
Official output
Short run 0.065 -0.056 -0.0001
Long run 0.024 -0.025 -0.0004
Shadow output
Short run -0.210 0.211 0.0004
Long run -0.223 0.264 0.002
Official Ricardian cons.
Short run -0.396 0.188 0.0006
Long run -0.255 0.078 0.002
Shadow Ricardian cons.
Short run -0.651 0.476 0.001
Long run -0.378 0.260 0.009
Official non-Ricardian cons.
Short run 0.009 -0.205 0.000004
Long run -0.067 -0.150 -0.0001
Shadow non-Ricardian cons.
Short run 0.203 0.093 -0.0003
Long run 0.054 0.022 -0.001
associated with rule-of-thumb consumers on fiscal multipliers are weakened in our model when
we incorporate shadow sector. From the computed multipliers, we observe that the two-sector
model multipliers with non-Ricardian consumers are reduced for all fiscal instruments considered
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compared to the single sector model making the amplifying effect induced by rule-of-thumb
consumers to be irrelevant. This may be attributed to the fact that disposable income of the
rule-of-thumb households as a weighted average of labour incomes earned in the two sectors is
virtually unaffected by the fiscal shocks. In short, the presence of shadow economy weakens
the government expenditure multiplier and strengthens the income tax multipliers because the
effects of relative consumption and factor inputs prices produce factor inputs reallocation in
the model. Our results also suggested that an economy with relatively large share of informal
sector, fiscal policy specifically income taxes can be used to stabilise the economy in response
to shocks.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper has introduced the rule-of-thumb consumers in a standard new Keynesian DSGE
model with shadow economy. It is motivated by the role played by rule-of-thumb consumers in
ensuring effective fiscal policy analysis and their importance in understanding the real business
cycle in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. In order to achieve the aim of the paper,
we adopt the Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) model and incorporate rule-of-thumb consumers
and the informal sector. We explicitly model fiscal policies to interact with monetary policy to
allow for appropriate analysis and the various channels of the fiscal policy transmissions. The
calibration involves exogenous processes that are asymmetric to the official sector consisting
of government spending shock, labour and capital income tax shocks. We specifically set the
share of the informal sector and the rule-of-thumb consumers to match the steady state share
of developing and emerging countries.
Our results have shown that, shadow economies play an important role in determining the
transmission channels of the fiscal policy on the real business cycle. We showed that in
economies with large informal sector, government spending shocks expand the formal sector
and slow down the activities in the shadow sector while tax hikes lead to a boost in the
shadow economy making the standard aggregate estimates of fiscal policies ineffective. Our
model account for the reallocation of factor services between the two economies as a result
of the role played by relative sectoral prices. Moreover, the various multipliers provided
an interesting result in the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers and shadow economy. We
found that shadow economy weakens the government expenditure multiplier whereas income
tax multipliers amplifies the effect of fiscal shocks specifically the labour income tax multiplier
which increase significantly. Finally, our results indicated that the amplifying mechanism caused
by rule-of-thumb consumers becomes significantly irrelevant because the disposable income of
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the rule-of-thumb households is virtually unaffected by the fiscal shocks. In effect, our model
presented a reduction in the various rule-of-thumb consumer multipliers when we introduce
shadow sector. Our model contributes to provide a theoretical background to policy-oriented
literature that sees households and sectoral heterogeneity as an important component of future
macroeconomic policy framework.
Future research should add and investigate the role of financial intermediaries (explicit financial
frictions and banking sector) in both sectors of the economy to regulate the financial market in
a medium-scaled model. This would enable us to understand the interactions of the two type of
households on their liquidity decisions especially the shadow savers and the financial market’s
interactions with fiscal and monetary rules.
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Figure 3.1: Response to Government Spending Shock (Official Economy)
Figure 3.2: Response to Government Spending Shock (Shadow Economy)
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Figure 3.3: Response to Labour Income Tax Shock (Official Economy)
Figure 3.4: Response to Labour Income Tax Shock (Shadow Economy)
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Figure 3.5: Response to Capital Income Tax Shock (Official Economy)
Figure 3.6: Response to Capital Income Tax Shock (Shadow Economy)
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Appendix A
Technical Appendices
A.1 Appendix to Chapter One
A.1.1 Symmetric Equilibrium of the Model
Households
Consumption in official sector
cot = ϕc
(
P ot
Pt
)−c
ct (A.1)
Consumption in unofficial sector
cut = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
ct (A.2)
Consumption price index
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (A.3)
Marginal utility of the consumption bundle
λt =
1
ct
(A.4)
Consumption Euler equation
λt = ε
RISK
t Rtβ
Etλt+1
pit+1
(A.5)
Labour supplied to official sector
P ot
Pt
wot =
χloφt
λt
(A.6)
Labour supplied to unofficial sector
Put
Pt
wut =
χluφt
λt
(A.7)
Labour market arbitrage condition
P ot
Pt
wot =
Put
Pt
wut (A.8)
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Official sector capital
Qot = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
P ot+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ot+1u
o
t+1 − a(uot+1)
]
+Qot+1(1− δ)
]
(A.9)
Unofficial sector capital
Qut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
Put+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ut+1u
u
t+1 − a(uut+1)
]
+Qut+1(1− δ)
]
(A.10)
Official sector investment
P ot
Pt
= Qot ε
INV
t
(
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)
− S′
(
iot
iot−1
)
iot
iot−1
)
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
Qot+1ε
INV
t+1 S
′
(
iot+1
iot
)(
iot+1
iot
)2
(A.11)
Unofficial sector investment
Put
Pt
= Qut
(
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)
− S′
(
iut
iut−1
)
iut
iut−1
)
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
Qut+1S
′
(
iut+1
iut
)(
iut+1
iut
)2
(A.12)
Official sector capital utilisation
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (A.13)
Unofficial sector capital utilisation
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (A.14)
Official sector capital
k¯ot+1 = (1− δ)k¯ot + εINVt
[
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)]
iot (A.15)
Unofficial sector capital
k¯ut+1 = (1− δ)k¯ut +
[
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)]
iut (A.16)
Official sector capital utilisation
kot = u
o
t k¯
o
t−1 (A.17)
Unofficial sector capital utilisation
kut = u
u
t k¯
u
t−1 (A.18)
Official Sector Goods Producers
Official sector output
yot = A
o
tk
o(αo)
t l
o(1−αo)
t (A.19)
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Official sector labour demand
wot = (1− αo)Aot
(
kot
lot
)αo
(A.20)
official sector capital demand
rk,ot = α
oAot
(
kot
lot
)−(1−αo)
(A.21)
Official sector marginal cost
mcI,ot =
(
rk,ot
αo
)αo(
wot
1− αo
)1−αo
(A.22)
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
Shadow sector output
yut = k
u(αu)
t l
u(1−αu)
t (A.23)
Unofficial sector labour demand
wut = (1− αu)
(
kut
lut
)αu
(A.24)
Unofficial sector capital demand
rk,ut = α
u
(
kut
lut
)−(1−αu)
(A.25)
Unofficial sector marginal cost
mcI,ut =
(
rk,ut
αu
)αu(
wut
1− αu
)1−αu
(A.26)
Final Goods Producers
Official sector NKPC
(1−mcot )ot = 1− κp
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)
piot
piot−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piot+1
piot
θpi
− 1
)
piot+1
piot
θpi
yot+1
yot
]
(A.27)
Unofficial sector NKPC
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)
piut
piut−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piut+1
piut
θpi
− 1
)
piut+1
piut
θpi
yut+1
yut
]
(A.28)
Aggregate inflation
Pt = pitPt−1 (A.29)
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Official sector inflation
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (A.30)
Unofficial sector inflation
Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (A.31)
Monetary Policy
Taylor’s rule
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (A.32)
Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
Official sector resource
yot = c
o
t + i
o
t + a(u
o
t )k¯
o
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yot (A.33)
Shadow sector resource
yut = c
u
t + i
u
t + a(u
u
t )k¯
u
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yut (A.34)
Aggregate consumption
ct =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cut )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (A.35)
Aggregate labour
lt = l
o
t + l
u
t (A.36)
Shock Processes
Risk premium shock
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (A.37)
Investment shock
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (A.38)
Official sector productivity shock
lnAot = ρ
AlnAot−1 + ξ
A
t (A.39)
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Price markup
lnεpt = ρ
plnεpt−1 + ξ
p
t (A.40)
Monetary policy shock
lnεRt = ρ
εlnεRt−1 + ξ
ε
t (A.41)
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A.1.2 Steady States of the model
In this section, we derive the steady states of the symmetric model whereby a variable with
subscript “s”represents the steady state of that variable. We therefore recursively derive the
steady states of the model whereby in the steady state, all variables are assumed to be constant.
Given the following properties about the capital adjustment cost function and capital utilisation:
S(.) = 0, S′(.) = 0 and a(.) = 0. From the capital utilisation equations (A.17) and (A.18), we
have in the steady state,
kis = k¯
i
s
which implies that,
uis = 1
From equation (A.5), and assuming zero inflation steady state, it holds that the steady state
return on government bond:
Rs =
1
β
and from equations (A.9) and (A.10), we obtain the steady state sectoral real return on capital
as:
rk,is =
1
β
− (1− δ)
It also implies from equations (A.13) and (A.14),
a′(uis) = r
k,i
s
This implies that households expect the same rate of returns from investing in the formal and
shadow sector capital. Assuming steady state exogenous shocks to be equal to one and given
rk,is , from equation (A.21) and (A.25), the steady state capital-labour ratio in the official sector
is obtained accordingly as:
kis
lis
=
(
rk,is
αi
)− 1
1−αi
The steady state output-capital ratio is also obtained accordingly from equation (A.19) and
(A.23) as:
yis
kis
=
(
kis
lis
)αi−1
From equations (A.15) and (A.16), we obtain steady state investment-capital ratio in both
sectors as:
iis
kis
= δ
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From equation (A.33), (A.34) and given that a(.) = 0 as well as steady state price adjustment
cost collapsing to zero, we obtain that:
cis
yis
= 1− i
i
s
yis
which implies that,
cis
yis
= 1− i
i
s
kis
kis
yis
and steady state investment-output ratio as:
iis
yis
= δ
(
kis
lis
)1−αi
From equations (A.29)-(A.31), it implies a steady state aggregate and sectoral inflation is
pis = pi
o
s = pi
u
s = 1. It also emerges from the final goods producers NKPC (A.27) and (A.28),
that the steady state average mark-up is given by:
1
mcis
=
i
i − 1
This implies that equations (A.22) and (A.26) can be defined in terms of their sectoral price
mark-ups as:
mcis =
(
rk,is
αi
)αi(
wis
1− αi
)1−αi
i − 1
i
=
(
rk,is
αi
)αi(
wis
1− αi
)1−αi
From equations (A.20) and (A.24), the nominal wage (wis) can be obtained as:
wis =
(
i − 1
i
) 1
1−αi
(
rk,is
αi
)− αi
1−αi (
1− αi)
Given the arbitrage condition in the labour market,
P os
Ps
wos =
Pus
Ps
wus
Thus, the relative prices are determined as:
P os
Pus
=
wus
wos
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By substitution,
P os
Pus
=
(
u−1
u
) 1
1−αu
(
rk,os
αo
) αo
1−αo
(1− αu)(
o−1
o
) 1
1−αo
(
rk,us
αu
) αu
1−αu
(1− αo)
From the relative size of the shadow sector equation SH = y
u
s
yos
, we have that:
SH =
yus
yos
=
1− ϕc
ϕc
(
Pus
P os
)−c (1− iosyos )
(1− iusyus )
SH =
1− ϕc
ϕc
(( u−1
u
) 1
1−αu
(
rk,os
αo
) αo
1−αo
(1− αu)(
o−1
o
) 1
1−αo
(
rk,us
αu
) αu
1−αu
(1− αo)
)c(1− δ( 1β−(1−δ)αo ))(
1− δ
(
1
β−(1−δ)
αu
))
Given the aggregate labour constraint ls = los + lus and calibrating ls = 0.25, from equation
(A.23), we have that:
lus =
(
kus
lus
)−αu
yus
However, SH = y
u
s
yos
; therefore,
lus =
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SHyos
and from equation (A.19), steady state official sector labour is:
los =
(
kos
los
)−αo
yos
Finally, from equation (A.36), we obtain that:
0.25 =
(
kos
los
)−αo
yos +
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SHyos
solving for yos , we obtain:
0.25 =
[(
kos
los
)−αo
+
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SH
]
yos
This enable us to obtain the steady state for other variables as:
yus = SHy
o
s
iis = δ
(
kis
lis
)1−αi
yis
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From equations (A.33) and (A.34),
cis = y
i
s − iis
lis =
(
kis
lis
)−αi
yis
From the consumption price index equation (A.3) and setting Ps = 1,
1
Pus
=
[
ϕc
(
P os
Pus
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
] 1
1−c
From labour market arbitrage condition,
P os = P
u
s
wus
wos
which also implies that,
Qis =
P is
Ps
From the aggregate consumption index (A.35) is given as:
cs =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
s)
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cus )
c−1
c
] c
c−1
From equations (A.6) and (A.7) we calibrate for χ as:
χ =
P is
Ps
wis
liφs cs
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A.1.3 Log-Linearised Model
The log-linearised relations are derived in accordance with the non-linear equilibrium
relationships where a variable with “hat”represent the log-deviations of that variable around
its steady state.
Households
The households consumption demand in both sectors, equations (A.1), (A.2) and price index
(A.3) give the following log-linearised equations:
ĉot = ĉt − c(P̂ ot − P̂t) (A.42)
ĉut = ĉt − c(P̂ut − P̂t) (A.43)
P̂t = ϕc
(
P os
Ps
)1−c
P̂ ot + (1− ϕc)
(
Pus
Ps
)1−c
P̂ut (A.44)
From the first order conditions of the households maximization problem for consumption (A.4),
government bond (A.5) and labour (A.6) we solve by substitution to obtain the following
equations:
The consumption Euler equation is obtained by solving equations (A.4) and (A.5) for ct as:
ĉt = ĉt+1 + Etpit+1 − R̂t − ε̂RISKt (A.45)
The equilibrium labour supplied is also obtained by substituting equation (A.4) into equation
(A.6) and (A.7) for real wage rate (wt) as:
P̂ ot − P̂t + ŵot = φl̂ot + ĉt (A.46)
P̂ut − P̂t + ŵut = φl̂ut + ĉt (A.47)
where real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between total labour supplied and
consumption. The arbitrage condition in the labour market ensures that both sectors pay the
same level of real wage given as:
P̂ ot + ŵ
o
t = P̂
u
t + ŵ
u
t (A.48)
From the official sector capital supplied (A.9) and unofficial sector capital supplied (A.10), the
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log-linearised version is derived symmetrically as follows:
QisQ̂
i
t =
(
β
P is
Ps
(
rk,is u
i
s− a(uis)
)
+Qis(1− δ)
)
(λ̂t+1− λ̂t) +βP
i
s
Ps
(
rk,is u
i
s− a(uis)
)(
P̂ it+1− P̂t+1
)
+
+β
P is
Ps
rk,is u
i
sr̂
k,i
t+1 + β
P is
Ps
[
rk,is − a′(uis)
]
uisû
i
t+1 + β(1− δ)QisQ̂it+1
Dividing through by Qis and noting from the sectoral investment equations (A.9) and (A.10),
it holds in the steady state that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
Q̂it = {β
(
rk,is u
i
s − a(uis)
)
+ (1− δ)}(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t) + β
(
rk,is u
i
s − a(uis)
)(
P̂ it+1 − P̂t+1
)
+
+βrk,is u
i
sr̂
k,i
t+1 + β
[
rk,is − a′(uis)
]
uisû
i
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂it+1
In the steady state, the following conditions must hold which simplifies the derivation of log-
linearised sectoral capital and investments. The sectoral capital utilisation equation in the
steady state is:
uis = 1
And we also identify the following properties from the capital adjustment cost function: S(.) =
0, S′(.) = 0, S′′(.) = $, a(.) = 0, a′(.) = rk,is and
a′′(.)
a′(.) =
a′′(1)
a′(1) = τ . Given the above conditions,
we can continue as:
Q̂it = β
(
rk,is + (1− δ)
)
(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t) + βrk,is
(
P̂ it+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ βrk,is r̂
k,i
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂it+1
From the steady state capital equation, it holds that,
1 = β[rk,is + (1− δ)]
1
β
= rk,is + (1− δ)
rk,is =
1
β
− (1− δ)
Therefore,
Q̂it = λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ it+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ [1− β(1− δ)]rk,it+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂it+1
Substituting the log-linearised marginal utility of consumption equation λ̂t = −ĉt,
Q̂it = ĉt − ĉt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ it+1 − P̂t+1 + r̂k,it+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Q̂it+1
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Log-linearised Euler equation for capital supplied to both official and shadow sector are given
respectively as:
Q̂ot = ĉt − ĉt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ ot+1 − P̂t+1 + r̂k,ot+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Q̂ot+1 (A.49)
Q̂ut = ĉt − ĉt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1 + r̂k,ut+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1 (A.50)
Following the first order conditions for sectoral investment equations (A.11) and (A.12), we
obtain the following log-linear equations:
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
[
Qs
(
−S′(1) 1
iis
−S′′(1) 1
iis
−S′(1) 1
iis
)
+βQs
(
S′′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
+2S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
))]
iisî
i
t+
+Qs
[
−S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
−S′′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
−S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)]
iisi
i
t−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)
1
iis
+2S′(1)
1
iis
)
iisî
i
t+1+
+
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t + βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1 + βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
]
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
(
1−S(1)−S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t+
[
Qs
(
−S′(1)−S′′(1)−S′(1)
)
+βQs
(
−S′′(1)−2S′(1)
)]̂
iit+
+Qs
[
S′(1)+S′′(1)+S′(1)
]
iit−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)+2S′(1)
)
îit+1+βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1+βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1−λ̂t
]
Dividing through by Qis and noting that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
P̂ it − P̂t =
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
Q̂it +
[(
− S′(1)− S′′(1)− S′(1)
)
+ β
(
− S′′(1)− 2S′(1)
)]̂
iit+
+
[
S′(1) + S′′(1) + S′(1)
]
iit−1 + β
(
S′′(1) + 2S′(1)
)
îit+1 + βS
′(1)Q̂it+1 + βS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
]
Following the above steady state conditions,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it −
(
S′′(1) + βS′′(1)
)
îit + S
′′(1)iit−1 + βS
′′(1)̂iit+1
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)S′′(1)̂iit + S′′(1)̂iit−1 + βS′′(1)̂iit+1
Given that S′′(1) = $ and solving for iit,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)$îit +$iit−1 + β$îit+1
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solving for iit,
îit =
Q̂it
(1 + β)$
+
îit−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îit+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ it − P̂t
)
Therefore, sectoral investments are given as:
îot =
1
(1 + β)$
Q̂ot +
îot−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îot+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ ot − P̂t
)
+
1
(1 + β)$
ε̂INVt (A.51)
îut =
Q̂ut
(1 + β)$
+
îut−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îut+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ut − P̂t
)
(A.52)
The log-linearised equation for the sectoral capital utilisation cost equations (A.13) and (A.14)
give the following:
rk,is r̂
k,i
t = a
′′(uit)u
i
s
r̂k,it =
a′′(1)
a′(1)
ûit
Given that a
′′(1)
a′(1) = τ , the sectoral first order conditions for capital utilisation cost is given
respectively as:
r̂k,ot = τ û
o
t (A.53)
r̂k,ut = τ û
u
t (A.54)
The log-linearised equation for both official and shadow sector capital accumulation equations
(A.15) and (A.16) are given respectively as:
̂¯kot+1 = (1− δ)̂¯kot + δ̂iot + δε̂INVt (A.55)
̂¯kut+1 = (1− δ)̂¯kut + δ̂iut (A.56)
whereby in the steady state, i
i
s
kis
= δ. The log-linearisation of capital utilisation equations (A.17)
and (A.18) give:
k̂ot = û
o
t +
̂¯kot−1 (A.57)
k̂ut = û
u
t +
̂¯kut−1 (A.58)
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Official Sector Goods Producers
The first order conditions for the official sector goods producers give the following log-linearised
equations in accordance to equations (A.19), (A.20), (A.21) and (A.22) as:
ŷot = Â
o
t + α
ok̂ot + (1− αo)l̂ot (A.59)
ŵot = Â
o
t + α
o(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.60)
r̂k,ot = Â
o
t − (1− αo)(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.61)
m̂c
I,o
t = α
or̂k,ot + (1− αo)ŵot (A.62)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
From the informal goods producers output and the first order conditions derived, the log-
linearised version of the various equations (A.23), (A.24), (A.25) and (A.26) are derived
respectively as:
ŷut = α
uk̂ut + (1− αu)l̂ut (A.63)
ŵut = α
u(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.64)
r̂k,ut = −(1− αu)(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.65)
m̂c
I,u
t = α
ur̂k,ut + (1− αu)ŵut (A.66)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Final Goods Producers
The standard NKPC is derived accordingly from equations (A.27) and (A.28) for both sectors.
Log-linearising the non.linear equations under a zero steady state inflation, the Rotemberg-
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pricing yield the following generalised NKPC respectively for official and shadow sectors as:
piot = βEtpi
o
t+1 +
o − 1
κp
(m̂c
o
t + ε̂
p
t ) (A.67)
and
piut = βEtpi
u
t+1 +
u − 1
κp
m̂c
u
t (A.68)
It emerges from the steady state that the average mark-up is given by the inverse of the real
marginal cost as:
mcis =
i − 1
i
The log-linearised version of aggregate and sectoral inflation, equations (A.29), (A.30) and
(A.31) are respectively given as:
pit + P̂t−1 = P̂t (A.69)
piot + P̂
o
t−1 = P̂
o
t (A.70)
piut + P̂
u
t−1 = P̂
u
t (A.71)
Monetary Policy
The log-linearisation of the monetary policy instrument (A.32) that is set by the central bank
is:
R̂t = ρ
RR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)(µpi)piot + ̂Rt (A.72)
Resource constraints
The log-linearised version of the aggregate resource constraints in both sectors (A.33), (A.34),
aggregate consumption (A.35) and the labour resource constraint (A.36), yield the following
log-linearised equations:
ŷot =
cos
yos
ĉot +
ios
yos
îot +
rk,os k
o
s
yos
ûot (A.73)
ŷut =
cus
yus
ĉut +
ius
yus
îut +
rk,us k
u
s
yus
ûut (A.74)
ĉt = ϕ
1
c
c
(
cos
cs
) c−1
c
ĉot + (1− ϕ)
1
c
(
cus
cs
) c−1
c
ĉut (A.75)
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l̂t =
los
ls
l̂ot +
lus
ls
l̂ut (A.76)
Shock Processes
The log-linearised equations for shocks in the official sector (A.37), (A.38), (A.39), (A.40) and
(A.41) that are considered in the model are given as:
Risk premium shock
ε̂RISKt = ρ
RISK ε̂RISKt−1 + ξ̂
RISK
t (A.77)
Investment shock
ε̂INVt = ρ
INV ε̂INVt−1 + ξ̂
INV
t (A.78)
Official sector productivity shock
Âot = ρ
AÂot−1 + ξ̂
A
t (A.79)
Price mark-up shock
ε̂pt = ρ
pε̂pt−1 + ξ̂
p
t (A.80)
Monetary policy shock
̂Rt = ρ
ε̂Rt−1 + ξ̂
ε
t (A.81)
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A.2 Appendix to Chapter Two
A.2.1 Symmetric Equilibrium of the Model
Households
Consumption in official sector
cot = ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
Pt
)−c
ct (A.82)
Consumption in unofficial sector
cut = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
ct (A.83)
Consumption price index
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (A.84)
Marginal utility of the consumption bundle
λt =
1
ct
(A.85)
Consumption Euler equation
λt = ε
RISK
t Rtβ
Etλt+1
pit+1
(A.86)
Labour supplied to official sector
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χloφt
λt
(A.87)
Labour supplied to unofficial sector
Put
Pt
wut =
χluφt
λt
(A.88)
Labour market arbitrage condition
P ot
Pt
wot (1− τwt ) =
Put
Pt
wut (A.89)
99
Official sector capital
Qot = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
P ot+1
Pt+1
(
(1− τkt+1)
[
rk,ot+1u
o
t+1 − a(uot+1)
]
+ τkt+1δ
)
+Qot+1(1− δ)
]
(A.90)
Unofficial sector capital
Qut = βEt
λt+1
λt
[
Put+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ut+1u
u
t+1 − a(uut+1)
]
+Qut+1(1− δ)
]
(A.91)
Official sector investment
P ot
Pt
= Qot ε
INV
t
(
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)
− S′
(
iot
iot−1
)
iot
iot−1
)
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
Qot+1ε
INV
t+1 S
′
(
iot+1
iot
)(
iot+1
iot
)2
(A.92)
Unofficial sector investment
Put
Pt
= Qut
(
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)
− S′
(
iut
iut−1
)
iut
iut−1
)
+ βEt
λt+1
λt
Qut+1S
′
(
iut+1
iut
)(
iut+1
iut
)2
(A.93)
Official sector capital utilisation
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (A.94)
Unofficial sector capital utilisation
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (A.95)
Official sector capital
k¯ot+1 = (1− δ)k¯ot + εINVt
[
1− S
(
iot
iot−1
)]
iot (A.96)
Unofficial sector capital
k¯ut+1 = (1− δ)k¯ut +
[
1− S
(
iut
iut−1
)]
iut (A.97)
Official sector capital utilisation
kot = u
o
t k¯
o
t−1 (A.98)
Unofficial sector capital utilisation
kut = u
u
t k¯
u
t−1 (A.99)
Official Sector Goods Producers
Official sector output
yot = A
o
tk
o(αo)
t l
o(1−αo)
t (A.100)
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Official sector labour demand
wot = (1− αo)Aot
(
kot
lot
)αo
(A.101)
official sector capital demand
rk,ot = α
oAot
(
kot
lot
)−(1−αo)
(A.102)
Official sector marginal cost
mcI,ot =
(
rk,ot
αo
)αo(
wot
1− αo
)1−αo
(A.103)
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
Shadow sector output
yut = k
u(αu)
t l
u(1−αu)
t (A.104)
Unofficial sector labour demand
wut = (1− αu)
(
kut
lut
)αu
(A.105)
Unofficial sector capital demand
rk,ut = α
u
(
kut
lut
)−(1−αu)
(A.106)
Unofficial sector marginal cost
mcI,ut =
(
rk,ut
αu
)αu(
wut
1− αu
)1−αu
(A.107)
Final Goods Producers
Official sector NKPC
(1−mcot )ot = 1− κp
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)
piot
piot−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piot+1
piot
θpi
− 1
)
piot+1
piot
θpi
yot+1
yot
]
(A.108)
Unofficial sector NKPC
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)
piut
piut−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piut+1
piut
θpi
− 1
)
piut+1
piut
θpi
yut+1
yut
]
(A.109)
Aggregate inflation
Pt = pitPt−1 (A.110)
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Official sector inflation
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (A.111)
Unofficial sector inflation
Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (A.112)
Monetary Policy
Taylor’s rule
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (A.113)
Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
Official sector resource
yot = c
o
t + i
o
t + gt + a(u
o
t )k¯
o
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yot (A.114)
Shadow sector resource
yut = c
u
t + i
u
t + a(u
u
t )k¯
u
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yut (A.115)
Aggregate consumption
ct =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cut )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (A.116)
Aggregate labour
lt = l
o
t + l
u
t (A.117)
Shock Processes
Risk premium shock
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (A.118)
Investment shock
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (A.119)
Official sector productivity shock
lnAot = ρ
AlnAot−1 + ξ
A
t (A.120)
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Price mark-up
lnεpt = ρ
plnεpt−1 + ξ
p
t (A.121)
Monetary policy shock
lnεRt = ρ
εlnεRt−1 + ξ
ε
t (A.122)
Government spending shock
lngt = ρ
Glngt−1 + ξGt (A.123)
Labour income tax shock
lnτWt = ρ
W lnτWt−1 + ξ
W
t (A.124)
Capital income tax shock
lnτKt = ρ
K lnτKt−1 + ξ
K
t (A.125)
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A.2.2 Steady States of the model
The steady states of the symmetric model is derived recursively whereby a variable with
subscript “s”represents the steady state of that variable. The following properties hold about
capital adjustment cost function and capital utilisation: S(.) = 0, S′(.) = 0 and a(.) = 0. We
set the steady state values for the fiscal variable τks , τws , τ c and g¯s as a percentage of GDP.
From the capital utilisation equations (A.98) and (A.99), we have in the steady state,
kis = k¯
i
s
which implies that,
uis = 1
From equation (A.86), and assuming zero inflation steady state, it holds that the steady state
return on government bond:
Rs =
1
β
and from equations (A.90) and (A.91), we obtain the steady state sectoral real return on capital
as:
rk,os =
1
(1− τks )
[
1
β
− τks δ − (1− δ)
]
rk,us =
1
β
− (1− δ)
It also implies from equations (A.94) and (A.95) that,
a′(uis) = r
k,i
s
This implies that households expect the same rate of returns from investing in the formal and
shadow sector capital. Assuming steady state exogenous shocks to be equal to one and given
rk,is , from equation (A.102) and (A.106), the steady state capital-labour ratio in the official
sector is obtained accordingly as:
kis
lis
=
(
rk,is
αi
)− 1
1−αi
The steady state output-capital ratio is also obtained accordingly from equation (A.100) and
(A.104) as:
yis
kis
=
(
kis
lis
)αi−1
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From equations (A.96) and (A.97), we obtain steady state investment-capital ratio in both
sectors as:
iis
kis
= δ
From equation (A.114), (A.115), and given that a(.) = 0. We impose gsyos = g¯s to obtain steady
state consumption-output ratio as:
cos
yos
= 1− i
o
s
yos
− g¯s
cus
yus
= 1− i
u
s
yus
where,
iis
yis
=
iis
kis
kis
yis
which implies a steady state investment-output ratio as:
iis
yis
= δ
(
kis
lis
)1−αi
From equations (A.110)-(A.112), it implies a steady state aggregate and sectoral inflation is
pis = pi
o
s = pi
u
s = 1. It also emerges from the final goods producers NKPC (A.108) and (A.109)
that the steady state average mark-up is given by:
1
mcis
=
i
i − 1
This implies that equations (A.103) and (A.107) can be defined in terms of their sectoral mark-
up prices as:
mcis =
(
rk,is
αi
)αi(
wis
1− αi
)1−αi
i − 1
i
=
(
rk,is
αi
)αi(
wis
1− αi
)1−αi
From equations (A.101) and (A.105), the nominal wage (wis) can be obtained as:
wis =
(
i − 1
i
) 1
1−αi
(
rk,is
αi
)− αi
1−αi (
1− αi)
Given the arbitrage condition in the labour market,
P os
Ps
wos(1− τws ) =
Pus
Ps
wus
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The relative prices are determined as:
P os
Pus
=
wus
wos(1− τws )
By substitution,
P os
Pus
=
(
u−1
u
) 1
1−αu
(
rk,os
αo
) αo
1−αo
(1− αu)(
o−1
o
) 1
1−αo
(
rk,us
αu
) αu
1−αu
(1− αo)(1− τws )
From the relative size of the shadow sector equation SH = y
u
s
yos
, we have that:
SH =
yus
yos
=
1− ϕc
ϕc
(
Pus
P os (1 + τ
c)
)−c (1− iosyos − g¯s)
(1− iusyus )
SH =
yus
yos
=
1− ϕc
ϕc
(
P os
Pus
)c
(1 + τ c)c
(1− iosyos − g¯s)
(1− iusyus )
SH =
1− ϕc
ϕc
(( u−1
u
) 1
1−αu
(
1
(1−τks )
[
1
β−τks δ−(1−δ)
]
αo
) αo
1−αo
(1− αu)(
o−1
o
) 1
1−αo
(
1
β−(1−δ)
αu
) αu
1−αu
(1− αo)
)c
∗
∗
(
1 + τ c
1− τws
)c(1− δ( 1(1−τks )
[
1
β−τks δ−(1−δ)
]
αo
)
− g¯s
)
(
1− δ
(
1
β−(1−δ)
αu
))
The above conditions allow to calibrate the steady state value for ϕc. Given the aggregate
labour constraint ls = los + lus and calibrating ls = 0.25, from equation (A.104), we have that:
lus =
(
kus
lus
)−αu
yus
However, SH = y
u
s
yos
; therefore,
lus =
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SHyos
and from equation (A.100), steady state official sector labour is:
los =
(
kos
los
)−αo
yos
Finally, from equation (A.117), we obtain that:
0.25 =
(
kos
los
)−αo
yos +
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SHyos
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solving for yos , we obtain:
0.25 =
[(
kos
los
)−αo
+
(
kus
lus
)−αu
SH
]
yos
This enable us to obtain the steady state for other variables as:
yus = SHy
o
s
iis = δ
(
kis
lis
)1−αi
yis
From equations (A.114) and (A.115),
cos = y
o
s − ios − g¯syos
cus = y
u
s − ius
lis =
(
kis
lis
)−αi
yis
From the consumption price index equation (A.84) and setting Ps = 1,
1
Pus
=
[
ϕc
(
P os
Pus
)1−c
(1 + τ c)1−c + (1− ϕc)
] 1
1−c
From labour market arbitrage condition,
P os = P
u
s
wus
wos(1− τws )
which also implies that from the investment equations (A.92) and (A.93),
Qis =
P is
Ps
From the aggregate consumption index (A.116) is given as:
cs =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o
s)
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cus )
c−1
c
] c
c−1
From equations (A.88) we calibrate for χ as:
χ =
Pus
Ps
wus
luφs cs
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A.2.3 Log-Linearised Model
The log-linearised relations are derived in accordance with the non-linear equilibrium
relationships where a variable with “hat”represent the log-deviations of that variable around
its steady state.
Households
The households consumption demand in both sectors, equations (A.82), (A.83) and price index
(A.84) give the following log-linearised equations:
ĉot = ĉt − c(P̂ ot (1 + τ c)− P̂t) (A.126)
ĉut = ĉt − c(P̂ut − P̂t) (A.127)
P̂t = ϕc
(
P os
Ps
)1−c
(1 + τ c)1−c P̂ ot + (1− ϕc)
(
Pus
Ps
)1−c
P̂ut (A.128)
From the first order conditions of the households maximization problem for consumption (A.85),
government bond (A.86) and labour (A.87) we solve by substitution to obtain the following
equations:
The consumption Euler equation is obtained by solving equations (A.85) and (A.86) for ct as:
ĉt = ĉt+1 + Etpit+1 − R̂t − ε̂RISKt (A.129)
The equilibrium labour supplied is also obtained by substituting equation (A.85) into equation
(A.87) and (A.88) for real wage rate (wt) as:
P̂ ot − P̂t + ŵot −
(
τws
1− τws
)
τ̂wt = φl̂
o
t + ĉt (A.130)
P̂ut − P̂t + ŵut = φl̂ut + ĉt (A.131)
where real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between total labour supplied and
consumption. The arbitrage condition in the labour market ensures that both sectors pay the
same level of real wage given as:
P̂ ot + ŵ
o
t −
(
τws
1− τws
)
τ̂wt = P̂
u
t + ŵ
u
t (A.132)
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From the official sector capital supplied (A.90) the log-linearised version is derived as follows:
QosQ̂
o
t = β
[
P os
Ps
(
(1− τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s − a(uos)
)
+ τks δ
)
+Qos(1− δ)
]
(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t)+
+β
P os
Ps
[
(1− τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s − a(uos)
)
+ τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1 − P̂t+1
)− βP os
Ps
τks r
k,o
s u
o
s(τ̂
k
t+1)+
+β
P os
Ps
(1− τks )rk,os uosr̂k,ot+1 + β
P os
Ps
(1− τks )
[
rk,os − a′(uos)
]
uosû
o
t+1 + β
P os
Ps
τks δτ̂
k
t+1 + β(1− δ)QosQ̂ot+1
Dividing through by Qis and noting from the sectoral investment equations (A.90) and (A.91),
it holds in the steady state that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
Q̂ot = β{(1−τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s−a(uos)
)
+τks δ+(1−δ)}(λ̂t+1−λ̂t)+β
[
(1−τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s−a(uos)
)
+τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+
−βτks rk,os uos(τ̂kt+1)+β(1−τks )rk,os uosr̂k,ot+1+β(1−τks )
[
rk,os −a′(uos)
]
uosû
o
t+1+βτ
k
s δτ̂
k
t+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
In the steady state, the following conditions must hold which simplifies the derivation of log-
linearised sectoral capital and investments. The sectoral capital utilisation equation in the
steady state is:
uis = 1
And we also identify the following properties from the capital adjustment cost function: S(.) =
0, S′(.) = 0, S′′(.) = $, a(.) = 0, a′(uis) = rk,is and
a′′(.)
a′(.) =
a′′(1)
a′(1) = τ . Given the above
conditions, we can continue as:
Q̂ot = β
[
(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)
]
(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t) + β
[
(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1 − P̂t+1
)
+
−βτks rk,os τ̂kt+1 + β(1− τks )rk,os r̂k,ot+1 + βτks δτ̂kt+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ot+1
From the steady state capital equation, it holds that,
1 = β[(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)]
1
β
= (1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)
1− β(1− δ) = β[(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ]
1− βτks δ − β(1− δ) = β(1− τks )rk,os
rk,os =
1
(1− τks )
[
1
β
− τks δ − (1− δ)
]
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Therefore,
Q̂ot = λ̂t+1−λ̂t+[1−β(1−δ)]
(
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+β(1−τks )rk,os rk,ot+1+β(δ−rk,os )τks τ̂kt+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
Substituting the log-linearised marginal utility of consumption equation λ̂t = −ĉt, we obtain
Log-linearised Euler equation for capital supplied to the official sector as:
Q̂ot = ĉt− ĉt+1+[1−β(1−δ)]
(
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+β(1−τks )rk,os r̂k,ot+1+β(δ−rk,os )τks τ̂kt+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
(A.133)
From unofficial sector capital supplied (A.91), the log-linearised version is derived as follows:
Qus Q̂
u
t =
(
β
Pus
Ps
(
rk,us u
u
s−a(uus )
)
+Qus (1−δ)
)
(λ̂t+1−λ̂t)+βP
u
s
Ps
(
rk,us u
u
s−a(uus )
)(
P̂ut+1−P̂t+1
)
+
+β
Pus
Ps
rk,us u
u
s r̂
k,u
t+1 + β
Pus
Ps
[
rk,us − a′(uus )
]
uus û
u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Qus Q̂ut+1
Dividing through by Qus and noting that Qus =
Pus
Ps
,
Q̂ut = {β
(
rk,us u
u
s − a(uus )
)
+ (1− δ)}(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t) + β
(
rk,us u
u
s − a(uus )
)(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+
+βrk,is u
u
s r̂
k,u
t+1 + β
[
rk,us − a′(uus )
]
uus û
u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
In the steady state, the conditions and properties about capital utilisation equation and the
capital adjustment cost function also hold in the shadow sector. This simplifies the derivation
of log-linearised shadow capital as:
Q̂ut = β
(
rk,us + (1− δ)
)
(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t) + βrk,us
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ βrk,us r̂
k,u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
From the steady state capital equation, it also holds that,
1 = β[rk,us + (1− δ)]
1
β
= rk,us + (1− δ)
rk,us =
1
β
− (1− δ)
Therefore,
Q̂ut = λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ [1− β(1− δ)]rk,ut+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
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Substituting the log-linearised marginal utility of consumption equation λ̂t = −ĉt, we obtain
Log-linearised Euler equation for capital supplied to the unofficial sector as:
Q̂ut = ĉt − ĉt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1 + r̂k,ut+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1 (A.134)
Following the first order conditions for sectoral investment equations (A.92) and (A.93), we
obtain the following log-linear equations:
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
[
Qs
(
−S′(1) 1
iis
−S′′(1) 1
iis
−S′(1) 1
iis
)
+βQs
(
S′′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
+2S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
))]
iisî
i
t+
+Qs
[
−S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
−S′′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)
−S′(1)
(
− i
i
s
ii2s
)]
iisi
i
t−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)
1
iis
+2S′(1)
1
iis
)
iisî
i
t+1+
+
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t + βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1 + βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
]
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
(
1−S(1)−S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t+
[
Qs
(
−S′(1)−S′′(1)−S′(1)
)
+βQs
(
−S′′(1)−2S′(1)
)]̂
iit+
+Qs
[
S′(1)+S′′(1)+S′(1)
]
iit−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)+2S′(1)
)
îit+1+βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1+βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1−λ̂t
]
Dividing through by Qis and noting that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
P̂ it − P̂t =
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
Q̂it +
[(
− S′(1)− S′′(1)− S′(1)
)
+ β
(
− S′′(1)− 2S′(1)
)]̂
iit+
+
[
S′(1) + S′′(1) + S′(1)
]
iit−1 + β
(
S′′(1) + 2S′(1)
)
îit+1 + βS
′(1)Q̂it+1 + βS
′(1)
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t
]
Following the above steady state conditions,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it −
(
S′′(1) + βS′′(1)
)
îit + S
′′(1)iit−1 + βS
′′(1)̂iit+1
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)S′′(1)̂iit + S′′(1)̂iit−1 + βS′′(1)̂iit+1
Given that S′′(1) = $ and solving for iit,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)$îit +$iit−1 + β$îit+1
111
solving for iit,
îit =
Q̂it
(1 + β)$
+
îit−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îit+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ it − P̂t
)
Therefore, sectoral investments are given as:
îot =
1
(1 + β)$
Q̂ot +
îot−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îot+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ ot − P̂t
)
+
1
(1 + β)$
ε̂INVt (A.135)
îut =
Q̂ut
(1 + β)$
+
îut−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îut+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ut − P̂t
)
(A.136)
The log-linearised equation for the sectoral capital utilisation cost equations (A.94) and (A.95)
give the following:
rk,is r̂
k,i
t = a
′′(uit)u
i
s
r̂k,it =
a′′(1)
a′(1)
ûit
Given that a
′′(1)
a′(1) = τ , the sectoral first order conditions for capital utilisation cost is given
respectively as:
r̂k,ot = τ û
o
t (A.137)
r̂k,ut = τ û
u
t (A.138)
The log-linearised equation for both official and shadow sector capital accumulation equations
(A.96) and (A.97) are given respectively as:
̂¯kot+1 = (1− δ)̂¯kot + δ̂iot + δε̂INVt (A.139)
̂¯kut+1 = (1− δ)̂¯kut + δ̂iut (A.140)
whereby in the steady state, i
i
s
kis
= δ. The log-linearisation of capital utilisation equations (A.98)
and (A.99) give:
k̂ot = û
o
t +
̂¯kot−1 (A.141)
k̂ut = û
u
t +
̂¯kut−1 (A.142)
112
Official Sector Goods Producers
The first order conditions for the official sector goods producers give the following log-linearised
equations in accordance to equations (A.100), (A.101), (A.102) and (A.103) as:
ŷot = Â
o
t + α
ok̂ot + (1− αo)l̂ot (A.143)
ŵot = Â
o
t + α
o(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.144)
r̂k,ot = Â
o
t − (1− αo)(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.145)
m̂c
I,o
t = α
or̂k,ot + (1− αo)ŵot (A.146)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
From the informal goods producers output and the first order conditions derived, the log-
linearised version of the various equations (A.104), (A.105), (A.106) and (A.107) are derived
respectively as:
ŷut = α
uk̂ut + (1− αu)l̂ut (A.147)
ŵut = α
u(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.148)
r̂k,ut = −(1− αu)(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.149)
m̂c
I,u
t = α
ur̂k,ut + (1− αu)ŵut (A.150)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Final Goods Producers
The standard NKPC is derived accordingly from equations (A.108) and (A.109) for both sectors.
Log-linearising the non.linear equations under a zero steady state inflation, the Rotemberg-
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pricing yield the following generalised NKPC respectively for official and shadow sectors as:
piot = βEtpi
o
t+1 +
o − 1
κp
(m̂c
o
t + ε̂
p
t ) (A.151)
and
piut = βEtpi
u
t+1 +
u − 1
κp
m̂c
u
t (A.152)
It emerges from the steady state that the average mark-up is given by the inverse of the real
marginal cost as:
mcis =
i − 1
i
The log-linearised version of aggregate and sectoral inflation, equations (A.110), (A.111) and
(A.112) are respectively given as:
pit + P̂t−1 = P̂t (A.153)
piot + P̂
o
t−1 = P̂
o
t (A.154)
piut + P̂
u
t−1 = P̂
u
t (A.155)
Monetary Policy
The log-linearisation of the monetary policy instrument (A.113) that is set by the central bank
is:
R̂t = ρ
RR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)(µpi)piot + ̂Rt (A.156)
Resource constraints
The log-linearised version of the aggregate resource constraints in both sectors (A.114), (A.115),
aggregate consumption (A.116) and the labour resource constraint (A.117), yield the following
log-linearised equations:
ŷot = g¯sĝt +
cos
yos
ĉot +
ios
yos
îot +
rk,os k
o
s
yos
ûot (A.157)
ŷut =
cus
yus
ĉut +
ius
yus
îut +
rk,us k
u
s
yus
ûut (A.158)
ĉt = ϕ
1
c
c
(
cos
cs
) c−1
c
ĉot + (1− ϕ)
1
c
(
cus
cs
) c−1
c
ĉut (A.159)
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l̂t =
los
ls
l̂ot +
lus
ls
l̂ut (A.160)
Shock Processes
The log-linearised equations for shocks in the official sector (A.118), (A.119), (A.120), (A.121),
(A.122), (A.123), (A.124) and (A.125) that are considered in the model are given as:
Risk premium shock
ε̂RISKt = ρ
RISK ε̂RISKt−1 + ξ̂
RISK
t (A.161)
Investment shock
ε̂INVt = ρ
INV ε̂INVt−1 + ξ̂
INV
t (A.162)
Official sector productivity shock
Âot = ρ
AÂot−1 + ξ̂
A
t (A.163)
Price mark-up shock
ε̂pt = ρ
pε̂pt−1 + ξ̂
p
t (A.164)
Monetary policy shock
̂Rt = ρ
ε̂Rt−1 + ξ̂
ε
t (A.165)
Government spending shock
ĝt = ρ
Gĝt−1 + ξ̂Gt (A.166)
Labour income tax shock
τ̂Wt = ρ
W τ̂Wt−1 + ξ̂
W
t (A.167)
Capital income tax shock
τ̂Kt = ρ
K τ̂Kt−1 + ξ̂
K
t (A.168)
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A.3 Appendix to Chapter Three
A.3.1 Symmetric Equilibrium of the Model
Ricardian households
Ricardian official consumption
co,rt = ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
Pt
)−c
crt (A.169)
Ricardian unofficial consumption
cu,rt = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
crt (A.170)
Ricardian consumption index
crt =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o,r
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cu,rt )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (A.171)
Ricardian marginal utility of consumption
λrt =
1
crt
(A.172)
Ricardian consumption Euler equation
λrt = ε
RISK
t RtβEt
λrt+1
pit+1
(A.173)
Ricardian labour supplied to official sector
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χl
o,r(φ)
t
λrt
(A.174)
Ricardian labour supplied to unofficial sector
Put
Pt
wut =
χl
u,r(φ)
t
λrt
(A.175)
Labour market arbitrage condition
P ot
Pt
wot (1− τwt ) =
Put
Pt
wut (A.176)
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Ricardian official sector capital
Qot = βEt
λrt+1
λrt
[
P ot+1
Pt+1
(
(1− τkt+1)
[
rk,ot+1u
o
t+1 − a(uot+1)
]
+ τkt+1δ
)
+Qot+1(1− δ)
]
(A.177)
Ricardian unofficial sector capital
Qut = βEt
λrt+1
λrt
[
Put+1
Pt+1
[
rk,ut+1u
u
t+1 − a(uut+1)
]
+Qut+1(1− δ)
]
(A.178)
Ricardian official sector investment
P ot
Pt
= Qot ε
INV
t
(
1− S
(
io,rt
io,rt−1
)
− S′
(
io,rt
io,rt−1
)
io,rt
io,rt−1
)
+ βEt
λrt+1
λrt
Qot+1ε
INV
t+1 S
′
(
io,rt+1
io,rt
)(
io,rt+1
io,rt
)2
(A.179)
Ricardian unofficial sector investment
Put
Pt
= Qut
(
1− S
(
iu,rt
iu,rt−1
)
− S′
(
iu,rt
iu,rt−1
)
iu,rt
iu,rt−1
)
+ βEt
λrt+1
λrt
Qut+1S
′
(
iu,rt+1
iu,rt
)(
iu,rt+1
iu,rt
)2
(A.180)
Ricardian official sector capital returns
rk,ot = a
′(uot ) (A.181)
Ricardian unofficial sector capital returns
rk,ut = a
′(uut ) (A.182)
Ricardian official sector capital accumulation
k¯o,rt+1 = (1− δ)k¯o,rt + εINVt
[
1− S
(
io,rt
io,rt−1
)]
io,rt (A.183)
Ricardian unofficial sector capital accumulation
k¯u,rt+1 = (1− δ)k¯u,rt +
[
1− S
(
iu,rt
iu,rt−1
)]
iu,rt (A.184)
Ricardian official sector capital utilisation
ko,rt = u
i
tk¯
o,r
t−1 (A.185)
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Ricardian unofficial sector capital utilisation
ku,rt = u
i
tk¯
u,r
t−1 (A.186)
Non-Ricardian households
Non-Ricardian official consumption
co,rtt = ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
Pt
)−c
crtt (A.187)
Non-Ricardian unofficial consumption
cu,rtt = (1− ϕc)
(
Put
Pt
)−c
crtt (A.188)
Non-Ricardian consumption index
crtt =
[
ϕ
1
c
c (c
o,rt
t )
c−1
c + (1− ϕc) 1c (cu,rtt )
c−1
c
] c
c−1 (A.189)
Non-Ricardian consumption marginal utility
λrtt =
1
crtt
(A.190)
Non-Ricardian official labour supplied
(1− τwt )
P ot
Pt
wot =
χl
o,rt(φ)
t
λrtt
(A.191)
Non-Ricardian unofficial labour supplied
Put
Pt
wut =
χl
u,rt(φ)
t
λrtt
(A.192)
Non-Ricardian budget constraint
crtt =
P ot
Pt
(1− τwt )wot lo,rtt +
Put
Pt
wut l
u,rt
t +
P ot
Pt
TRrtt (A.193)
Consumption price index
Pt =
[
ϕc
(
P ot (1 + τ
c)
)1−c
+ (1− ϕc)
(
Put
)1−c] 11−c (A.194)
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Official Sector Goods Producers
Official sector output
yot = A
o
tk
o(αo)
t l
o(1−αo)
t (A.195)
Official sector labour demand
wot = (1− αo)Aot
(
kot
lot
)αo
(A.196)
official sector capital demand
rk,ot = α
oAot
(
kot
lot
)−(1−αo)
(A.197)
Official sector marginal cost
mcI,ot =
(
rk,ot
αo
)αo(
wot
1− αo
)1−αo
(A.198)
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
Shadow sector output
yut = k
u(αu)
t l
u(1−αu)
t (A.199)
Unofficial sector labour demand
wut = (1− αu)
(
kut
lut
)αu
(A.200)
Unofficial sector capital demand
rk,ut = α
u
(
kut
lut
)−(1−αu)
(A.201)
Unofficial sector marginal cost
mcI,ut =
(
rk,ut
αu
)αu(
wut
1− αu
)1−αu
(A.202)
Final Goods Producers
Official sector NKPC
(1−mcot )ot = 1− κp
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)
piot
piot−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piot+1
piot
θpi
− 1
)
piot+1
piot
θpi
yot+1
yot
]
(A.203)
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Unofficial sector NKPC
(1−mcut )u = 1− κp
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)
piut
piut−1
θpi
+ κpβEt
λt+1
λt
[(
piut+1
piut
θpi
− 1
)
piut+1
piut
θpi
yut+1
yut
]
(A.204)
Aggregate inflation
Pt = pitPt−1 (A.205)
Official sector inflation
P ot = pi
o
tP
o
t−1 (A.206)
Unofficial sector inflation
Put = pi
u
t P
u
t−1 (A.207)
Government Policy
Government budget constraint
gt +
Bt−1
P ot
+ TRt = τ
w
t w
o
t l
o
t + τ
k
t
[
rk,ot u
o
t − a(uot )− δ
]
k¯ot + τ
ccot +
Bt
P ot Rt
+ Tt (A.208)
Taylor’s rule
Rt = R
(ρR)
t−1 (pi
o
t )
µpi(1−ρR)εRt (A.209)
Aggregation
Aggregate official consumption
cot = (1− θ)co,rt + θco,rtt (A.210)
Aggregate unofficial consumption
cut = (1− θ)cu,rt + θcu,rtt (A.211)
Aggregate consumption
ct = (1− θ)crt + θcrtt (A.212)
Aggregate official labour supplied
lot = (1− θ)lo,rt + θlo,rtt (A.213)
Aggregate unofficial labour supplied
lut = (1− θ)lu,rt + θlu,rtt (A.214)
120
Ricardian labour supplied
lrt = l
o,r
t + l
u,r
t (A.215)
Non-Ricardian labour supplied
lrtt = l
o,rt
t + l
u,rt
t (A.216)
Aggregate labour
lt = (1− θ)lrt + θlrtt (A.217)
Aggregate official investment
iot = (1− θ)io,rt (A.218)
Aggregate unofficial investment
iut = (1− θ)iu,rt (A.219)
Aggregate official capital
kot = (1− θ)ko,rt (A.220)
Aggregate unofficial capital
kut = (1− θ)ku,rt (A.221)
Aggregate transfers
TRt = (1− θ)TRrt + θTRrtt (A.222)
Market Clearing and Resource Constraint
Official sector resource
yot = c
o
t + i
o
t + gt + a(u
o
t )k¯
o
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piot
piot−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yot (A.223)
Shadow sector resource
yut = c
u
t + i
u
t + a(u
u
t )k¯
u
t−1 +
κp
2
(
piut
piut−1
θpi
− 1
)2
yut (A.224)
Shock Processes
Risk premium shock
lnεRISKt = ρ
RISK lnεRISKt−1 + ξ
RISK
t (A.225)
Investment shock
lnεINVt = ρ
INV lnεINVt−1 + ξ
INV
t (A.226)
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Official sector productivity shock
lnAot = ρ
AlnAot−1 + ξ
A
t (A.227)
Price mark-up
lnεpt = ρ
plnεpt−1 + ξ
p
t (A.228)
Monetary policy shock
lnεRt = ρ
εlnεRt−1 + ξ
ε
t (A.229)
Government spending shock
lngt = ρ
Glngt−1 + ξGt (A.230)
Labour income tax shock
lnτWt = ρ
W lnτWt−1 + ξ
W
t (A.231)
Capital income tax shock
lnτKt = ρ
K lnτKt−1 + ξ
K
t (A.232)
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A.3.2 Log-Linearised Model
The log-linearised relations are derived in accordance with the non-linear equilibrium
relationships where a variable with “hat”represent the log-deviations of that variable around
its steady state.
Ricardian households
The households consumption demand in both sectors, equations (A.169), (A.170) and aggregate
consumption index (A.171) give the following log-linearised equations:
ĉo,rt = ĉ
r
t − c(P̂ ot (1 + τ c)− P̂t) (A.233)
ĉu,rt = ĉ
r
t − c(P̂ut − P̂t) (A.234)
ĉrt = ϕ
1
c
c
(
co,rs
crs
) c−1
c
ĉo,rt + (1− ϕc)
1
c
(
cu,rs
crs
) c−1
c
ĉu,rt (A.235)
From the first order conditions of the households maximization problem for consumption
(A.172), government bond (A.173) and labour (A.174) we solve by substitution to obtain the
following equations:
The consumption Euler equation is obtained by solving equations (A.172) and (A.173) for ct
as:
ĉrt = ĉ
r
t+1 + Etpit+1 − R̂t − ε̂RISKt (A.236)
The equilibrium labour supplied is also obtained by substituting equation (A.172) into equation
(A.174) and (A.175) for real wage rate (wt) as:
P̂ ot − P̂t + ŵot −
(
τws
1− τws
)
τ̂wt = φl̂
o,r
t + ĉ
r
t (A.237)
P̂ut − P̂t + ŵut = φl̂u,rt + ĉrt (A.238)
where real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between total labour supplied and
consumption. The arbitrage condition in the labour market equation (A.176) ensures that both
sectors pay the same level of real wage given as:
P̂ ot + ŵ
o
t −
(
τws
1− τws
)
τ̂wt = P̂
u
t + ŵ
u
t (A.239)
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From the official sector capital supplied (A.177) the log-linearised version is derived as follows:
QosQ̂
o
t = β
[
P os
Ps
(
(1− τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s − a(uos)
)
+ τks δ
)
+Qos(1− δ)
]
(λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt )+
+β
P os
Ps
[
(1− τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s − a(uos)
)
+ τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1 − P̂t+1
)− βP os
Ps
τks r
k,o
s u
o
s(τ̂
k
t+1)+
+β
P os
Ps
(1− τks )rk,os uosr̂k,ot+1 + β
P os
Ps
(1− τks )
[
rk,os − a′(uos)
]
uosû
o
t+1 + β
P os
Ps
τks δτ̂
k
t+1 + β(1− δ)QosQ̂ot+1
Dividing through by Qis and noting from the sectoral investment equations (A.90) and (A.91),
it holds in the steady state that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
Q̂ot = β{(1−τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s−a(uos)
)
+τks δ+(1−δ)}(λ̂rt+1−λ̂rt )+β
[
(1−τks )
(
rk,os u
o
s−a(uos)
)
+τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+
−βτks rk,os uos(τ̂kt+1)+β(1−τks )rk,os uosr̂k,ot+1+β(1−τks )
[
rk,os −a′(uos)
]
uosû
o
t+1+βτ
k
s δτ̂
k
t+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
In the steady state, the following conditions must hold which simplifies the derivation of log-
linearised sectoral capital and investments. The sectoral capital utilisation equation in the
steady state is:
uis = 1
And we also identify the following properties from the capital adjustment cost function: S(.) =
0, S′(.) = 0, S′′(.) = $, a(.) = 0, a′(uis) = rk,is and
a′′(.)
a′(.) =
a′′(1)
a′(1) = τ . Given the above
conditions, we can continue as:
Q̂ot = β
[
(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)
]
(λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt ) + β
[
(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ
](
P̂ ot+1 − P̂t+1
)
+
−βτks rk,os τ̂kt+1 + β(1− τks )rk,os r̂k,ot+1 + βτks δτ̂kt+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ot+1
From the steady state capital equation, it holds that,
1 = β[(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)]
1
β
= (1− τks )rk,os + τks δ + (1− δ)
1− β(1− δ) = β[(1− τks )rk,os + τks δ]
1− βτks δ − β(1− δ) = β(1− τks )rk,os
rk,os =
1
(1− τks )
[
1
β
− τks δ − (1− δ)
]
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Therefore,
Q̂ot = λ̂
r
t+1−λ̂rt +[1−β(1−δ)]
(
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+β(1−τks )rk,os rk,ot+1+β(δ−rk,os )τks τ̂kt+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
Substituting the log-linearised marginal utility of consumption equation λ̂rt = −ĉrt , we obtain
Log-linearised Euler equation for capital supplied to the official sector as:
Q̂ot = ĉ
r
t− ĉrt+1+[1−β(1−δ)]
(
P̂ ot+1−P̂t+1
)
+β(1−τks )rk,os r̂k,ot+1+β(δ−rk,os )τks τ̂kt+1+β(1−δ)Q̂ot+1
(A.240)
From unofficial sector capital supplied (A.178), the log-linearised version is derived as follows:
Qus Q̂
u
t =
(
β
Pus
Ps
(
rk,us u
u
s−a(uus )
)
+Qus (1−δ)
)
(λ̂rt+1−λ̂rt )+β
Pus
Ps
(
rk,us u
u
s−a(uus )
)(
P̂ut+1−P̂t+1
)
+
+β
Pus
Ps
rk,us u
u
s r̂
k,u
t+1 + β
Pus
Ps
[
rk,us − a′(uus )
]
uus û
u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Qus Q̂ut+1
Dividing through by Qus and noting that Qus =
Pus
Ps
,
Q̂ut = {β
(
rk,us u
u
s − a(uus )
)
+ (1− δ)}(λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt ) + β
(
rk,us u
u
s − a(uus )
)(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+
+βrk,is u
u
s r̂
k,u
t+1 + β
[
rk,us − a′(uus )
]
uus û
u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
In the steady state, the conditions and properties about capital utilisation equation and the
capital adjustment cost function also hold in the shadow sector. This simplifies the derivation
of log-linearised shadow capital as:
Q̂ut = β
(
rk,us + (1− δ)
)
(λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt ) + βrk,us
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ βrk,us r̂
k,u
t+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
From the steady state capital equation, it also holds that,
1 = β[rk,us + (1− δ)]
1
β
= rk,us + (1− δ)
rk,us =
1
β
− (1− δ)
Therefore,
Q̂ut = λ̂
r
t+1 − λ̂rt + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1
)
+ [1− β(1− δ)]rk,ut+1 + β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1
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Substituting the log-linearised marginal utility of consumption equation λ̂rt = −ĉrt , we obtain
Log-linearised Euler equation for capital supplied to the unofficial sector as:
Q̂ut = ĉ
r
t − ĉrt+1 + [1− β(1− δ)]
(
P̂ut+1 − P̂t+1 + r̂k,ut+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Q̂ut+1 (A.241)
Following the first order conditions for sectoral investment equations (A.179) and (A.180), we
obtain the following log-linear equations:
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
[
Qs
(
−S′(1) 1
ii,rs
−S′′(1) 1
ii,rs
−S′(1) 1
ii,rs
)
+βQs
(
S′′(1)
(
− i
i,r
s
ii,r2s
)
+2S′(1)
(
− i
i,r
s
ii,r2s
))]
ii,rs î
i,r
t +
+Qs
[
−S′(1)
(
− i
i,r
s
ii,r2s
)
−S′′(1)
(
− i
i,r
s
ii,r2s
)
−S′(1)
(
− i
i,r
s
ii,r2s
)]
ii,rs i
i,r
t−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)
1
ii,rs
+2S′(1)
1
ii,rs
)
ii,rs î
i,r
t+1+
+
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t + βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1 + βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt
]
P is
Ps
(
P̂ it−P̂t
)
=
(
1−S(1)−S′(1)
)
QsQ̂
i
t+
[
Qs
(
−S′(1)−S′′(1)−S′(1)
)
+βQs
(
−S′′(1)−2S′(1)
)]̂
ii,rt +
+Qs
[
S′(1)+S′′(1)+S′(1)
]
ii,rt−1+βQs
(
S′′(1)+2S′(1)
)
îi,rt+1+βS
′(1)QsQ̂it+1+βQsS
′(1)
[
λ̂rt+1−λ̂rt
]
Dividing through by Qis and noting that Qis =
P is
Ps
,
P̂ it − P̂t =
(
1− S(1)− S′(1)
)
Q̂it +
[(
− S′(1)− S′′(1)− S′(1)
)
+ β
(
− S′′(1)− 2S′(1)
)]̂
ii,rt +
+
[
S′(1) + S′′(1) + S′(1)
]
ii,rt−1 + β
(
S′′(1) + 2S′(1)
)
îi,rt+1 + βS
′(1)Q̂it+1 + βS
′(1)
[
λ̂rt+1 − λ̂rt
]
Following the above steady state conditions,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it −
(
S′′(1) + βS′′(1)
)
îi,rt + S
′′(1)ii,rt−1 + βS
′′(1)̂ii,rt+1
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)S′′(1)̂ii,rt + S′′(1)̂ii,rt−1 + βS′′(1)̂ii,rt+1
Given that S′′(1) = $ and solving for ii,rt ,
P̂ it − P̂t = Q̂it − (1 + β)$îi,rt +$ii,rt−1 + β$îi,rt+1
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solving for ii,rt ,
îi,rt =
Q̂it
(1 + β)$
+
îi,rt−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îi,rt+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ it − P̂t
)
Therefore, sectoral investments are given as:
îo,rt =
1
(1 + β)$
Q̂ot +
îo,rt−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îo,rt+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ ot − P̂t
)
+
1
(1 + β)$
ε̂INVt (A.242)
îu,rt =
Q̂ut
(1 + β)$
+
îu,rt−1
(1 + β)
+
β
(1 + β)
îu,rt+1 −
1
(1 + β)$
(
P̂ut − P̂t
)
(A.243)
The log-linearised equation for the sectoral capital utilisation cost equations (A.181) and (A.182)
give the following:
rk,is r̂
k,i
t = a
′′(uit)u
i
s
r̂k,it =
a′′(1)
a′(1)
ûit
Given that a
′′(1)
a′(1) = τ , the sectoral first order conditions for capital utilisation cost is given
respectively as:
r̂k,ot = τ û
o
t (A.244)
r̂k,ut = τ û
u
t (A.245)
The log-linearised equation for both official and shadow sector capital accumulation equations
(A.183) and (A.184) are given respectively as:
̂¯ko,rt+1 = (1− δ)̂¯ko,rt + δ̂io,rt + δε̂INVt (A.246)
̂¯ku,rt+1 = (1− δ)̂¯ku,rt + δ̂iu,rt (A.247)
whereby in the steady state, i
i,r
s
ki,rs
= δ. The log-linearisation of capital utilisation equations
(A.185) and (A.186) give:
k̂o,rt = û
o
t +
̂¯ko,rt−1 (A.248)
k̂u,rt = û
u
t +
̂¯ku,rt−1 (A.249)
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Non-Ricardian households
The non-Ricardian households consumption demand in both sectors, equations (A.187), (A.188)
and aggregate consumption index (A.189) give the following log-linearised equations:
ĉo,rtt = ĉ
rt
t − c(P̂ ot (1 + τ c)− P̂t) (A.250)
ĉu,rtt = ĉ
rt
t − c(P̂ut − P̂t) (A.251)
ĉrtt = ϕ
1
c
c
(
co,rts
crts
) c−1
c
ĉo,rtt + (1− ϕc)
1
c
(
cu,rts
crts
) c−1
c
ĉu,rtt (A.252)
The equilibrium labour supplied is also obtained by substituting equation (A.190) into equation
(A.191) and (A.192) for real wage rate (wt) as:
P̂ ot − P̂t + ŵot −
(
τws
1− τws
)
τ̂wt = φl̂
o,rt
t + ĉ
rt
t (A.253)
P̂ut − P̂t + ŵut = φl̂u,rtt + ĉrtt (A.254)
where real wage is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between total labour supplied and
consumption. The log-linearised non-Ricardian budget constraint (A.193) gives:
ĉrtt = (1−τws )
(
wos l
o,rt
s
crts
)
(ŵot + l̂
o,rt
t )−
(
τws
1− τws
)(
wos l
o,rt
s
crts
)
τ̂wt +
(
wus l
u,rt
s
crts
)
(ŵut + l̂
u,rt
t ) (A.255)
The log-linearised aggregate consumption price index, equation (A.194) gives:
P̂t = ϕc
(
P os
Ps
)1−c
(1 + τ c)1−c P̂ ot + (1− ϕc)
(
Pus
Ps
)1−c
P̂ut (A.256)
Official Sector Goods Producers
The first order conditions for the official sector goods producers give the following log-linearised
equations in accordance to equations (A.195), (A.196), (A.197) and (A.198) as:
ŷot = Â
o
t + α
ok̂ot + (1− αo)l̂ot (A.257)
ŵot = Â
o
t + α
o(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.258)
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r̂k,ot = Â
o
t − (1− αo)(k̂ot − l̂ot ) (A.259)
m̂c
I,o
t = α
or̂k,ot + (1− αo)ŵot (A.260)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Shadow Sector Goods Producers
From the informal goods producers output and the first order conditions derived, the log-
linearised version of the various equations (A.199), (A.200), (A.201) and (A.202) are derived
respectively as:
ŷut = α
uk̂ut + (1− αu)l̂ut (A.261)
ŵut = α
u(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.262)
r̂k,ut = −(1− αu)(k̂ut − l̂ut ) (A.263)
m̂c
I,u
t = α
ur̂k,ut + (1− αu)ŵut (A.264)
Only the first three equations are needed for calibrations.
Final Goods Producers
The standard NKPC is derived accordingly from equations (A.203) and (A.204) for both sectors.
Log-linearising the non.linear equations under a zero steady state inflation, the Rotemberg-
pricing yield the following generalised NKPC respectively for official and shadow sectors as:
piot = βEtpi
o
t+1 +
o − 1
κp
(m̂c
o
t + ε̂
p
t ) (A.265)
and
piut = βEtpi
u
t+1 +
u − 1
κp
m̂c
u
t (A.266)
It emerges from the steady state that the average mark-up is given by the inverse of the real
marginal cost as:
mcis =
i − 1
i
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The log-linearised version of aggregate and sectoral inflation, equations (A.205), (A.206) and
(A.207) are respectively given as:
pit + P̂t−1 = P̂t (A.267)
piot + P̂
o
t−1 = P̂
o
t (A.268)
piut + P̂
u
t−1 = P̂
u
t (A.269)
Monetary Policy
The log-linearisation of the monetary policy instrument (A.209) that is set by the central bank
is:
R̂t = ρ
RR̂t−1 + (1− ρR)(µpi)piot + ̂Rt (A.270)
Aggregation
The log-linearised equations for the aggregate equations (A.210) to (A.222) are given
respectively as follows:
ĉot = (1− θ)ĉo,rt + θĉo,rtt (A.271)
ĉut = (1− θ)ĉu,rt + θĉu,rtt (A.272)
ĉt = (1− θ)ĉrt + θĉrtt (A.273)
l̂ot = (1− θ)l̂o,rt + θl̂o,rtt (A.274)
l̂ut = (1− θ)l̂u,rt + θl̂u,rtt (A.275)
l̂rt =
lo,rs
lrs
l̂o,rt +
lu,rs
lrs
l̂u,rt (A.276)
l̂rtt =
lo,rts
lrts
l̂o,rtt +
lu,rts
lrts
l̂u,rtt (A.277)
l̂t = (1− θ)l̂rt + θl̂rtt (A.278)
îot = (1− θ)̂io,rt (A.279)
îut = (1− θ)̂iu,rt (A.280)
k̂ot = (1− θ)k̂o,rt (A.281)
k̂ut = (1− θ)k̂u,rt (A.282)
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T̂Rt = (1− θ)T̂R
r
t + θT̂R
rt
t (A.283)
Resource constraints
The log-linearised version of the aggregate resource constraints in both sectors (A.223) and
(A.224) yield the following log-linearised equations:
ŷot = g¯sĝt +
cos
yos
ĉot +
ios
yos
îot +
rk,os k
o
s
yos
ûot (A.284)
ŷut =
cus
yus
ĉut +
ius
yus
îut +
rk,us k
u
s
yus
ûut (A.285)
Shock Processes
The log-linearised equations for asymmetric shocks in the official sector equations (A.225) to
(A.232) that are considered in the model are given as:
Risk premium shock
ε̂RISKt = ρ
RISK ε̂RISKt−1 + ξ̂
RISK
t (A.286)
Investment shock
ε̂INVt = ρ
INV ε̂INVt−1 + ξ̂
INV
t (A.287)
Official sector productivity shock
Âot = ρ
AÂot−1 + ξ̂
A
t (A.288)
Price mark-up shock
ε̂pt = ρ
pε̂pt−1 + ξ̂
p
t (A.289)
Monetary policy shock
̂Rt = ρ
ε̂Rt−1 + ξ̂
ε
t (A.290)
Government spending shock
ĝt = ρ
Gĝt−1 + ξ̂Gt (A.291)
Labour income tax shock
τ̂Wt = ρ
W τ̂Wt−1 + ξ̂
W
t (A.292)
Capital income tax shock
τ̂Kt = ρ
K τ̂Kt−1 + ξ̂
K
t (A.293)
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